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I. INTRODUCTION
The special status of juveniles in our criminal justice system has
been recognized for more than a century.' Despite this recognition,
many jurisdictions continue to evaluate a juvenile's waiver of his or her
privilege against self-incrimination by standards identical or very similar
to those used to evaluate the waivers of adults.2 Indeed, the Supreme
Court of the United States has determined that the waiver of a juvenile
during a custodial interrogation may be evaluated by the same standards
as an adult's waiver.3
Other jurisdictions, recognizing both the vulnerability of juveniles
during custodial interrogation and the traditional protection of youth in
1. For a discussion of the treatment of juveniles in the criminal justice sys-
tem, see infra notes 25-36 and accompanying text.
2. These courts generally analyze the validity of a juvenile's waiver by look-
ing at the totality of the circumstances surrounding the waiver. For a discussion
of this approach and its application in various jurisdictions, see ilfra notes 59-66
and accompanying text.
3. Fare v. Michael C., 442 U.S. 707, 725, 728 (1979). For a discussion of
the Supreme Court's opinion in Michael C., see iiifra notes 54-56 and accompany-
ing text.
(1235)
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American society, have provided additional safeguards to ensure that ju-
venile suspects understand their constitutional rights before they can
make an effective waiver. 4 One such safeguard, known as the "per se"
rule, provides that a juvenile's waiver of any constitutional right is not
effective unless the juvenile has consulted with an interested and in-
formed adult prior to waiving that right.5 Scholars have repeatedly rec-
ommended the adoption of a per se rule and have commended the
Pennsylvania judiciary for adopting such a protection.! Pennsylvania
opinions also have been cited in other jurisdictions as support for the
adoption of the per se rule, sometimes referred to as the "interested
adult" rule. 7 Recently, however, Pennsylvania has retreated from this
highly praised position and reverted to a former and, by some stan-
dards, much less enlightened test for evaluating the validity of juvenile
waivers.8
This comment will first review the constitutional right against self-
incrimination as it has been applied to adults and juveniles. Next, the
comment will discuss the various methods for evaluating the validity of
juvenile confessions, the rationales underlying each of these methods,
and the empirical evidence regarding the effectiveness of each method.
Finally, this comment will review the development of Pennsylvania case
law in this area and propose a resolution to the Pennsylvania Supreme
Court's apparent inability to define a stable standard for evaluating
juveniles' waivers.
4. For a discussion of such additional protections, see infra notes 89-114
and accompanying text.
5. For a discussion of the per se rule, see infra notes 89-110 and accompa-
nying text.
6. See, e.g., Grisso,Juveniles' Capacities to Vaive 11iranda Rights: An Empirical
Analysis, 68 CALIF. L. REV. 1134, 1166 (1980) (per se rule should include consul-
tation with attorney before juvenile's waiver can be "effective"); Comment, Penn-
sylvania Supreme Court Review, 49 TEMP. L. Q. 558, 704-12 (1976) [hereinafter
cited as Comment, Pa. S. Ct. Review] (Pennsylvania's per se rule is significant step
toward meaningful protection of juveniles in pre-judicial stage of criminal pro-
cess); Note, Preadjudicatory Confession and Consent Searches: Placing the Juvenile on the
Same Constitutional Footing as an Adult, 57 B.U.L. REV. 778, 792 (1977) [hereinafter
cited as Note, Preadjudicatory Confessions] (per se rule is compelled in order to
afford juveniles the same protection as adults). For a discussion of Penn-
sylvania's adoption of the per se rule, see infra notes 129-148 and accompanying
text.
7. See, e.g., In re Dino, 359 So. 2d 586, 593 (La.) (Pennsylvania courts in
adopting the per se rule have concluded that the advice of an adult helps remove
the juvenile's impediment of immaturity), cert. denied, 439 U.S. 1047 (1978).
8. The latest in a series of opinions from the Pennsylvania Supreme Court
that have eroded, and finally abandoned, the per se rule was Commonwealth v.
Williams, 504 Pa. 511, 475 A.2d 1283 (1984). For a discussion of the [l'illianis
case, see infra notes 161-68 and accompanying text.
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II. THE PRIVILEGE AGAINST SELF-INCRIMINATION AND
WAIVER BY ADULTS
The United States Constitution guarantees to every individual the
privilege against self-incrimination. 9 Traditionally, however, a criminal
suspect has been allowed to waive this constitutional right.", Such a
waiver, though, is invalid and the confession is excluded from evidence
if the waiver and confession were not voluntary. I Involuntary confes-
sions have been rejected because of concerns that they are unreliable
and may reflect unconstitutional and illegal police practices.' 2 In deter-
9. U.S. CONST. amend. V. The fifth amendment provides in pertinent part:
"[N]or shall [anyone] be compelled in any criminal case to be a witness against
himself, nor be deprived of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law
.... Id. In the early confession cases, the United States Supreme Court relied
on the fifth amendment as a basis for excluding coerced confessions from fed-
eral trials. See, e.g., Brain v. United States, 168 U.S. 532, 542 (1897) (issue of
voluntariness of confessions in federal criminal cases is controlled by fifth
amendment). See generally L. LEVY, ORIGINS OF THE FIFTH AMENDMENT, THE
RIGHT AGAINST SELF-INCRIMINATION 46 (1968); Note, Self-Incrimination: Privilege,
Immunity, and Comment in Bar Disciplinary Proceedings, 72 MicH. L. REV. 84, 85-88
(1973). When examining the voluntariness of a confession in a state criminal
proceeding, however, the Court initially relied on the due process clause of the
fourteenth amendment. Brown v. Mississippi, 297 U.S. 278, 285-86 (1936). See
generally Ritz, Twenty-Five Years of State Criminal Confession Cases in the U.S. Supreme
Court, 19 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 35 (1962); Comment, Development in the Law-
Confessions, 79 HARV. L. REV. 935 (1966). The fifth amendment had not yet been
held applicable to the states. See Twining v. New Jersey, 211 U.S. 78 (1908).
The Supreme Court eliminated the existing confusion concerning the use of
separate constitutional provisions to evaluate the propriety of confessions when
it held that the fifth amendment privilege against self-incrimination was enforce-
able against the states through the fourteenth amendment. Malloy v. Hogan,
378 U.S. 1, 8 (1964). Confessions are now admissible under a voluntariness
standard as determined under the fifth amendment, which standard is now iden-
tical in federal and state courts. Davis v. North Carolina, 384 U.S. 737, 740
(1966). For a general discussion of the use of confessions in court, see Rogge,
Proof by Confession, 12 VILL. L. REV. 1 (1966).
10. See, e.g., Johnson v. Zerbst, 304 U.S. 458 (1938).
11. See Brown v. Mississippi, 297 U.S. 278 (1936). A waiver of a constitu-
tional right may be valid only if there has been "an intentional relinquishment or
abandonment of a known right or privilege," i.e., a voluntary waiver. Johnson v.
Zerbst, 304 U.S. 458, 464 (1938).
In describing the standard employed to determine if a waiver was voluntary,
the Supreme Court stated that the inquiry is whether
the confession [is] the product of an essentially free and unconstrained
choice by the maker[.] If it is, if he has willed to confess, it may be used
against him. If it is not, if his will has been overborne and his capacity
for self-determination is critically impaired, the use of his confession
offends due process.
Culombe v. Connecticut, 367 U.S. 568, 602 (1961).
The voluntariness standard has not always been the norm. At early com-
mon law, confessions were admissible as convictions, not evidence, even if the
confessions were involuntary in that they had resulted from threats, torture, or
promises. 3J. WIGMORE, EVIDENCE § 818, at 292-93 (Chadbourn rev. ed. 1970).
12. Jackson v. Denno, 378 U.S. 368, 385-86 (1964).
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mining the voluntariness of an adult's confession, the courts have gener-
ally examined the totality of the circumstances surrounding the
confession. ' 3 Under this approach, the courts review the characteristics
of the accused 14 and the details of the interrogation 15 to determine
whether the confession was freely given.
The landmark case of Miranda v. Arizona16 set forth protections in-
tended to ensure that a suspect's confession would not be the result of
coercion, intimidation, or ignorance of rights. 17 The Miranda Court rec-
ognized that custodial interrogation' 8 of persons suspected or accused
of crimes was inherently coercive because the interrogation environ-
ment was generally intended to subjugate the suspect to the will of his
examiner. 11' In this environment, the Court concluded that "protective
13. See, e.g., Greenwald v. Wisconsin, 390 U.S. 519, 521 (1968); Havnes v.
Washington, 373 U.S. 503, 513-14 (1963); Culombe v. Connecticut, 367 U.S.
568, 601-02 (1961); Lisenba v. California, 314 U.S. 219, 235 (1941).
14. See, e.g., Clewis v. Texas, 386 U.S. 707, 712 (1967) (poor health and
fifth-grade education level); Davis v. North Carolina, 384 U.S. 737, 742 (1966)
(previous criminal experience); Lynumn v. Illinois, 372 U.S. 528, 534 (1963)
(sex of accused); Townsend v. Sain, 372 U.S. 293, 306-07 (1963) (drugged con-
dition); Reck v. Pate, 367 U.S. 433, 441 (1961) (low intelligence); Blackburn v.
Alabama, 361 U.S. 199, 207-08 (1960) (impaired mental condition); Spano v.
New York, 360 U.S. 315, 322-23 (1959) (fatigue); Payne v. Arkansas, 356 U.S.
560, 567 (1958) (impaired mental condition); Fikes v. Alabama, 352 U.S. 191,
196-97 (1957) (subnormal intelligence).
15. See, e.g., Clewis v. Texas, 386 U.S. 707, 711-12 (1967) (intermittent in-
terrogation during 38-hour period, accompanied by lack of food and sleep);
Garrity v. NewJersey, 385 U.S. 493, 497 (1967) (accused threatened with loss of
job for failure to answer); Davis v. North Carolina, 384 U.S. 737, 752 (1966)
(extended period of detention and interrogation); Haynes v. Washington, 373
U.S. 503, 514 (1963) (police refused suspect's requests to call wife or lawyer);
Reck v. Pate, 367 U.S. 433, 441-42 (1961) (1,'ngth of time held incommunicado);
Culombe v. Connecticut, 367 U.S. 568, 609 (1961) (access to attorney denied);
Spano v. New York, 360 U.S. 315, 321-23 (1959) (official pressure; sympathy
falsely aroused); Ashdown v. Utah, 357 U.S. 426, 430-31 (1958) (disposition of
interrogators); Payne v. Arkansas, 356 U.S. 560, 567 (1958) (threat of physical
harassment); Turner v. Pennsylvania, 338 U.S. 62, 63-64 (1949) (number of in-
terrogators); Watts v. Indiana, 338 U.S. 49, 52-54 (1949) (length of interroga-
tion); Harris v. South Carolina, 338 U.S. 68, 70-71 (1949) (condition of place of
interrogation); Ashcraft v. Tennessee, 322 U.S. 143, 153-54 (1944) (repeated
and prolonged questioning).
16. 384 U.S. 436 (1966).
17. Id. at 467-68. The Court concluded that without such protections cus-
todial interrogation "contains inherently compelling pressures which [would]
work to undermine the individual's will to resist and to compel him to speak
where he would not otherwise do so freely." Id. at 467. The Court stated that
only with proper safeguards would those pressures be combatted such that the
accused would retain full opportunity to exercise the privilege against self-in-
crimination. Id.
18. The Miranda Court defined custodial interrogation as any questioning
by law enforcement officers "after a person has been taken into custody or
otherwise deprived of his freedom of action in any significant way." Id. at 444
(footnote omitted).
19. Id. at 457-58.
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devices" were necessary to prevent potential abuse.20 The Court there-
fore devised what are now commonly known as the "Miranda warnings,"
which inform the accused of 1) his right to remain silent; 2) his right to
the presence of an attorney during interrogation; 3) if indigent, his right
to appointed counsel; and 4) the state's right to use anything said by the
accused against him in court.2 1
Any confession by an individual who has not first received the Mi-
randa warnings or their equivalent is not admissible in court. Once the
Miranda warnings have been administered, however, a suspect may
waive the right to remain silent provided that the waiver is made volun-
tarily, knowingly, and intelligently. 22 When a suspect makes a statement
in the absence of counsel during custodial investigation, the government
bears a heavy burden to demonstrate the conditions that render such a
waiver admissible.2 3 Under Miranda, courts are to utilize the totality of
the circumstances test for determining the validity of the waiver.24
III. THE JUVENILE JUSTICE SYSTEM
Generally, the law with regard to the privilege against self-incrimi-
nation has treated juveniles as it treats adults. 25 Some distinctions have
been made, however, in the development of this law in order to accom-
modate the special status of the juvenile. 26
Historically, many constitutional rights have not been extended to
juveniles undergoing prosecution in the juvenile court system.2 7 This
practice resulted from the courts' conception of the relationship be-
tween the state and the juvenile as that of parent and child, otherwise
20. Id. at 458.
21. Id. at 444, 467-73. The Court observed, however, that Congress and
the states remained free to establish alternative means to protect a person's right
to remain silent. Id. at 467. Under Miranda, a suspect who has initially waived
his right to remain silent has the right to stop the custodial questioning at an%
time and request counsel. Id. at 473-74. Thus, the interrogation must cease at
any time the individual indicates in any manner his wish to remain silent. Id.
22. Id. at 475-76.
23. Id.
24. Id.
25. See, e.g., Planned Parenthood of Central Missouri v. Danforth, 428 U.S.
52, 74 (1976) ("Constitutional rights do not mature and come into being magi-
cally only when one attains the state-defined age of majority. Minors, as well as
adults, are protected by the Constitution and possess constitutional rights.").
26. For a discussion of these distinctions, see infra notes 37-56 and accom-
panying text.
27. Some of the constitutional guarantees have been held inapplicable be-
cause of the non-criminal nature ofjuvenile proceedings. In re Castro, 243 Cal.
App. 2d 402, 407-08, 52 Cal. Rptr. 469, 472 (1966). For a discussion of the non-
criminal nature of juvenile proceedings, see generally Antieau, Constitutional
Rights in Juvenile Courts, 46 CORNELL L. REV. 387 (1961); Quick, Constitutional
Rights in the Juvenile Court, 12 How. L.J. 76 (1966); Waite, How Far Can Court
Procedure be Socialized Without Impairing Individual Rights?, 12 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMI-
NOLOGY 339 (1921).
1985] COMMENT 1239
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known as the doctrine of parens patriae.28 Under this doctrine, the juve-
nile court was supposed to assume custody of the child and to assure the
provision of proper care and treatment. ' 1 The juvenile court system
treated juvenile offenders as wards of the state and labelled them delin-
quent rather than criminal. " Thus, the juvenile system was based upon
a different philosophy than the adult criminal system 3 l and, because of
its paternalistic philosophical underpinnings, the juvenile system was
viewed as non-adversarial and civil rather than criminal in nature.3 2 The
goal of the juvenile system was not to punish but to rehabilitate and
treat the offender.3 3 The unfortunate result of this system's philosophy
was that juvenile offenders were not regarded as individuals in need of
protection from the state, and thus they did not receive the same consti-
tutional protections guaranteed to adult criminal suspects.3 4
Eventually the judiciary recognized that, although laudable, the
28. In re Holmes, 379 Pa. 599, 603, 109 A.2d 523, 525 (1954), cert. denied,
348 U.S. 973 (1955). Under the doctrine of parenspatriae, the state steps into the
shoes of the parent and assumes responsibility for the child under the notion
that the parents have failed or are unable to properly perform their parental
duties and functions. Note, The Juvenile Court, 23 HARV. L. REV. 104, 109 (1909).
Translated literally, parens patriae means "father of the country." H. Lou, JUVE-
NILE COURTS IN THE UNITED STATES 4 (1927).
29. See Shears, Legal Problems Peculiar to Children ' Courts, 48 A.B.A. J. 719,
720 (1962). Historically, the juvenile justice system's position concerning the
rights of minors was that they have the right to proper care and treatment-the
right to custody-rather than to the procedural protections necessary to ensure
liberty. Id. at 720-21.
30. S. DAVIS, RIGHTS OFJUVENILES: THE JUVENILE JUSTICE SYSTEM § 1.2 (2d
ed. 1980). Crimes committed by juveniles were deemed the result of over-
whelming environmental factors and not the result of any malice or reasoned
judgment of the juvenile. McKeiver v. Pennsylvania, 403 U.S. 528, 551-52
(1971) (White, J., concurring). The juvenile court system was based on the
premise that the individual had not erred, but, rather, society had. Id.
31. For a discussion of the premise underlying the juvenile court system,
see supra note 30. The first juvenile court was established in Chicago in 1899
with a primary focus of rehabilitation rather than punishment. An Act to Regul-
late the Treatment and Control of Dependent, Neglected and Delinquent Chil-
dren §§ 1, 21, 1899 Ill. Laws 131 (current version at ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 37,
§§ 701-708 (1971)).
See generally PRESIDENT'S COMMISSION ON LAW ENFORCEMENT AND ADMINIS-
TRATION OF JUSTICE, TASK FORCE REPORT: JUVENILE DELINQUENCY AND YOUTH
CRIME 1 (1967); Note, Reconciling Lara with Gault: Extension of Juvenile Rights or
Liabilities?, I SAN. FERN. V.L. REV. 167 (1968).
32. S. DAVIS, supra note 30, § 1.2. Juvenile proceedings were informal and
were designed not to establish guilt or innocence but to determine whether the
juvenile's actions warranted rehabilitative treatment by the state. 0. KETCHAM &
M. PAULSEN, CASES AND MATERIALS RELATED TO JUVENILE COURTS 1-20 (1967).
33. See 0. KETCHAM & M. PAULSEN, supra note 32, at 1-20. Because of the
juvenile court's philosophy that errors of the child are faults of society and not
of the child, the goal of the juvenile court system was to rehabilitate the child as
a useful member of society instead of permanently labelling the juvenile as a
criminal. Id.
34. In re Gault, 387 U.S. 1, 15-17 (1967). For example, the privilege against
self-incrimination was available to juveniles only when they were being prose-
1240 [Vol. 30: p. 1235
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goals of the juvenile court system were not being achieved.3 5 The infor-
mal nature of juvenile court hearings had led to the exercise of unbri-
dled discretion by judges.3 6 Recognition of these problems led to a
reevaluation of the status of juveniles within the juvenile court system.
A. Juveniles and the Privilege Against Self-Incrimination
Before considering the adequacy of the procedural protections af-
forded by the juvenile justice system, the United States Supreme Court
had recognized that minors prosecuted under adult criminal proceed-
ings possess the same constitutional protections as adults and thus,
while in police custody, should not be interrogated in a manner offen-
sive to due process. In Haley v. Ohio,3 7 the Supreme Court considered
the circumstances under which the confession of a juvenile should be
deemed to have been given voluntarily in an adult proceeding. In Haley,
a fifteen-year-old's confession was admitted into evidence and the youth
was subsequently convicted of murder.38 Before confessing, the juve-
nile had been beaten, had been repeatedly questioned by numerous
teams of police from midnight until 5:00 a.m. without the presence of
counsel, and had been held incommunicado for three days following his
confession.3 9' The Court held that the juvenile's confession was inad-
missible because it had been obtained in a manner which violated the
due process clause of the fourteenth amendment. 4 °1
The Haley Court, although evaluating the confession by examining
cuted as adults in criminal proceedings. See generally Comment, Immunity and
Subsequent Informial Punishment, 69J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 332 (1978).
35. In re Gault, 387 U.S. 1, 15-17 (1967). "There is evidence.., that there
may be grounds for concern that the child receives the worst of both worlds:
that he gets neither the protections accorded to adults nor the solicitous care
and regenerative treatment postulated for children." Id. at 18 n.23 (quoting
Kent v. United States, 383 U.S. 541, 556 (1966)).
36. Id. at 17-20. This "unbridled discretion however benevolently moti-
vated, is frequently a poor substitute for principle and procedure." Id. at 18.
Thus, the absence of procedural rules has frequently resulted in arbitrariness
and unfairness. Id. at 18-19.
37. 332 U.S. 596 (1948).
38. Id. at 597, 599. The defendant objected to the admission of the confes-
sion, claiming it violated his rights under the fourteenth amendment. Id. at 599.
He was convicted of first degree murder and sentenced to life imprisonment. Id.
at 597.
39. Id. at 597-98. At no time prior to his confession was the juvenile ad-
vised of his right to counsel. Id. at 598. After the juvenile made an oral confes-
sion, he was advised as a part of his written confession of his right to remain
silent and of the fact that his confession might be used against him at a trial. Id.
An attorney retained by the juvenile's mother was twice denied access to the
juvenile. Id. The juvenile's mother was not allowed to visit her son until the
fifth day of his detention. Id.
40. Id. at 601. The Court stated that "[n]either man nor child can be al-
lowed to stand condemned by methods which flout constitutional requirements
of due process of law." Id.
1985] COMMENT 1241
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the totality of the circumstances, recognized that juveniles were more
susceptible to coercive police practices than adults and accordingly con-
cluded that the circumstances surrounding the juvenile's confession
must be carefully scrutinized. 4' The Court reasoned that:
What transpired would make us pause for careful inquiry if a
mature man were involved. And when, as here, a mere child-
an easy victim of the law-is before us, special care in scrutiniz-
ing the record must be used. Age 15 is a tender and difficult
age .... He cannot be judged by the more exacting standards
of maturity. That which would leave a man cold and unim-
pressed can overawe and overwhelm a lad in his early teens
.... Mature men might stand the ordeal .... But we cannot
believe that a lad of tender years is a match for the police in
such a contest. He needs counsel and support if he is not to
become the victim first of fear, then of panic. He needs some-
one on whom to lean lest the overpowering presence of the
law, as he knows it, crush him.4 2
Some years later in Gallegos v. Colorado,4 3 the Supreme Court again
held that the admission of a juvenile's confession violated the due pro-
cess clause. 44 In Gallegos, the police had held a fourteen-year-old boy for
five days and interrogated him without access to a lawyer, a parent, or
any other "friendly" adult. 4 5 The juvenile was ultimately convicted of
murder, but the Court found the confession inadmissible and reversed
the conviction. 4 6 The Court reasoned that teenagers need special pro-
41. Id. at 600-01. The factors examined by the Court in Haley included the
accused's age, the particular time of day during which he was questioned, the
length of the questioning, the lack of friend or counsel to whom the juvenile
could turn for advice, and "the callous attitude of the police towards his rights."
Id.
42. Id. at 599-600.
43. 370 U.S. 49 (1962).
44. Id. at 55. The Court stated that the due process clause prohibits a con-
fession which is "so inlherentfly coercive that its ver, existence is irreconcilable with the
possession of mental freedom by a lone suspect against whom its coercive force is
brought to bear." Id. at 52 (quoting Ashcraft v. Tennessee, 322 U.S. 143, 154
(1944)) (emphasis supplied by the Gallegos Court).
45. Id. at 50. The juvenile was originally held on charges of assault and
robbery. Id. Because the victim later died as a result of the assault, the juvenile
was also charged with first degree murder. Id. The juvenile orally confessed to
the assault and robbery immediately upon his arrest, and he also signed a writ-
ten statement after five days of incommunicado detention. Id.
46. Id. at 55. The Court looked at the totality of the circumstances to evalu-
ate the validity of the juvenile's waiver. Id. The factors the Court considered
were the age of the accused, the length of detention, the failure of the police to
send for thejuvenile's parents or to immediately take him before a juvenile court
judge, and the lack of adult assistance (either attorney or parent). Id. As it had
in Haley, the Court stressed the juvenile's youth and immaturity as the factors
that determined the invalidity of the juvenile's waiver. Id. at 54-55.
8
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tection in the form of adult advice in order to equalize the differences in
power between the police, as interrogators, and juveniles, as suspects,
and in order to alleviate the burden of the juvenile's own immaturity. 4 7
Because both Haley and Gallegos were decided prior to Miranda, the
question remained open whether the Constitution required the police to
give the Miranda warnings to juveniles. In In re Gault,4 8 however, the
Supreme Court extended fundamental constitutional guarantees, in-
cluding the privilege against self-incrimination, to juveniles in delin-
quency proceedings in order to alleviate the unchecked judicial
discretion and unfairness of the juvenile court system. 49 Significantly,
the Court stated that if counsel was not present when ajuvenile made an
admission while in custody, a court must take care to make sure the ad-
mission was voluntary "in the sense not only that it was not coerced or
suggested, but also that it was not the product of ignorance of rights or
of adolescent fantasy, fright or despair."' 50 However, the opinion in
Gault was explicitly limited to the adjudicatory stage of the juvenile de-
linquency determination, leaving unanswered the question whether
47. Id. at 54-55. The Court reasoned that a juvenile lacks the experience
and wisdom necessary to understand the consequences of his or her confession.
Id. at 54. However, a lawyer, adult relative, or adult friend, the Court suggested,
would provide the necessary maturity to place the juvenile on a more equal foot-
ing with the police. Id. The Court concluded that, without this protection, a
juvenile would not be able to know or to assert his or her constitutional rights.
Id. Therefore, according to the Court, ajuvenile's immature judgment renders
him incapable of exercising his constitutional rights. Id. at 54-55.
48. 387 U.S. 1 (1967). In Gault, a fifteen-year-old boy was committed to a
,juvenile home until he reached the age of majority despite the absence of any
warning as to his right to counsel, privilege against self-incrimination, or ade-
quate notice of the delinquency hearing. Id. at 4-8. For further discussion of the
Supreme Court's opinion in Gault, see Dorsen & Rezneck, In Re Gault and the
Futmre ofiivenile Law, 1 FAM. L.Q. 1 (1967); Lefstin, Stapleton & Teitlebaum, In
Search ofivenile Justice Gault and Its Implementation, 3 L. & Soc. REV. 491 (1969);
Patilsen,]nvenile Courts and the Legacy of '67, 43 IND. L.J. 527 (1968).
49. 387 U.S. at 19-31. The Court observed that the doctrine of parens pa-
triae then operating in the juvenile justice system, and the lack of procedural
protections engendered by that philosophy, led to arbitrary decisions by juvenile
judges and "inadequate or inaccurate findings of fact and unfortunate prescrip-
tions of remedy." Id. at 19-20. The Court then held that in addition to the
privilege against self-incrimination, juveniles are entitled to the constitutional
rights of notice of charges, confrontation, and cross-examination. Id. at 29. The
Court had first expressed its dissatisfaction with the juvenile justice system the
year before Gault, when it held that a juvenile, when relegated to adult criminal
proceedings, must receive a hearing replete with due process and fair treatment
protection commensurate with that of an adult. Kent v. United States, 383 U.S.
541, 561-62 (1966). The Court's extension of thejuvenile's constitutional rights
in Kent was not, however, comprehensive. Shortly after Gault, for example, the
Court declined to extend the right to trial by jury to juvenile proceedings. McK-
eiver v. Pennsylvania, 403 U.S. 528, 545 (1971). The Court was willing to
forego some constitutional protections that were unnecessary for a fair proceed-
ing in order to retain some of the advantages of the juvenile system. Id. at 534-
550.
50. 387 U.S. at 55 (footnote omitted).
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these protections should be extended to the preadjudicatory stages. 5'
Although this question has yet to be addressed by the Supreme Court,52
many states, by case law or by statute, have independently extended the
protections of Miranda to the preadjudicatory stages of juvenile
proceedings.53
Recently, in Fare v. Michael C.54 the Supreme Court declined to ex-
tend special protection to the juvenile or to recognize the special situa-
tion of juveniles, as it had done previously in Gault.55 Moreover, in
51. Id. at 13. The Court refused to decide whether such protections should
be extended because "[t]he problems of pre-adjudication treatment ofjuveniles,
and of post-adjudication disposition, are unique to the juvenile process." Id. at
31 n.48.
The Court stated, however, that "jilt would be surprising if the privilege
against self-incrimination extended to hardened criminals but not to children
[because t]he language of the Fifth Amendment... is unequivocal and without
exception." Id. at 47.
52. Recently, the Supreme Court noted that it had not yet applied Miranda
to exclude evidence obtained in violation of Miranda from the preadjudicatory
stages ofjuvenile proceedings. Fare v. Michael C., 442 U.S. 707, 717 n.4 (1979).
In Michael C., the Court again declined to decide that issue, instead assuming
that the lliranda principles were fully applicable to the juvenile proceeding that
was the subject of the opinion. Id.
53. See, e.g., In re Teters, 264 Cal. App. 2d 816, 70 Cal. Rptr. 749 (1968); In
re Creek, 243 A.2d 49 (D.C. 1968); Riley v. State, 237 Ga. 124, 226 S.E.2d 922
(1976); People v. Horton, 126 I1. App. 2d 401, 261 N.E.2d 693 (1970); In re
Dino, 359 So. 2d 586 (La.), cert. denied, 439 U.S. 1047 (1978); State v. Loyd, 297
Minn. 442, 212 N.W.2d 671 (1973); State v. Sinderson, 455 S.W.2d 486 (Mo.
1970); In re Aaron D., 30 A.D.2d 183, 290 N.Y.S.2d 935 (1968); In re Burrus, 275
N.C. 517, 169 S.E.2d 879 (1969), aff'd, 403 U.S. 528 (1971); Commonwealth v.
Darden, 441 Pa. 41, 271 A.2d 257 (1970), cert. denied, 401 U.S. 1004 (1971);
Leach v. State, 428 S.W.2d 817 (Tex. Civ. App. 1968); Forest v. State, 76 Wash.
2d 84, 455 P.2d 368 (1969). Federal courts have impliedly held that .Mliranda
applies to the preadjudication stages as well. See, e.g., United States v. Fowler,
476 F.2d 1091 (7th Cir. 1973); Lopez v. United States, 399 F.2d 865 (9th Cir.
1968); West v. United States, 399 F.2d 467 (5th Cir. 1968), cert. denied, 393 U.S.
1102 (1969).
Other states apply the Miranda safeguards by statute. See, e.g., ARIz. R. Juv.
Cr. P. 18 (1979); CAL. WELr. & INST. CODE § 625 (West 1984); COLO. REV. STAT.
§ 19-2-102(3)(c)(I) (Supp. 1978); CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 46b-137 (West Supp.
1984); GA. CODE ANN. § 24A-2002(b) (1976) (Miranda protections impliedly re-
quired); OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 10, § 1109 (West Supp. 1984-1985); TENN. CODE
ANN. § 37-227(b) (1977) (Miranda safeguards necessarily incorporated). But see
TEX. FAM. CODE ANN. § 51.09(b)(2) (Vernon Supp. 1985) (extrajudicial state-
ment that leads to corroborating evidence admissible despite absence of .liranda
warnings).
54. 442 U.S. 707 (1979).
55. The Supreme Court held in Michael C. that a juvenile's request to see
his probation officer during custodial interrogation does not invoke the privilege
against self-incrimination. Id. at 724. The juvenile had requested to see his
probation officer after Miranda warnings were given, and later argued that his
request to see his probation officer was akin to an adult's request to see an attor-
ney and that the subsequent confession should be inadmissible. Id. at 710, 712.
Justice Powell, in a dissenting opinion, disagreed with the majority's treat-
ment of the juvenile, reasoning that the court in Ganlt had recognized that "the
1244
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reaffirming that the totality of the circumstances approach was sufficient
for evaluating whether the confession of a juvenile was a product of a
voluntary, knowing, and intelligent waiver of his privilege against self-
incrimination, the Supreme Court quelled any speculation that it would
provide additional preadjudicatory safeguards to juveniles.5- 1
B. The Admissibility of Juvenile Confessions
While the United States Supreme Court has approved the use of the
totality of the circumstances test to evaluate the validity of a juvenile's
waiver of the privilege against self-incrimination, 5 7 several states have
afforded additional protections to juveniles during custodial interroga-
tion.58 In order to properly evaluate the Pennsylvania Supreme Court's
particular treatment of this issue, the advantages, disadvantages, and un-
derlying rationale of these protections should be understood.
1. The Totality of the Circumstances Test
Most jurisdictions employ the traditional totality of the circum-
stances test to decide whether a juvenile has voluntarily, knowingly, and
intelligently waived his or her privilege against self-incrimination. 511
greatest care must be taken to assure that the admission was voluntary." Id. at
734 (Powell, J., dissenting) (citation omitted). Justice Powell concluded that
under the totality of the circumstances (including age, actual maturity, family
environment, education, emotional, mental stability, and previous criminal ex-
periences), the juvenile's confession in Michael C. was not voluntary. Id. at 734 &
n.4. For a discussion of the Court's previous recognition of the special situation
of juveniles, see stpra notes 37-53 and accompanying text.
56. In the opinion of one commentator:
For the past three decades the general trend-in case law, statutory
law, and commentary-has been to prcvide a juvenile greater protec-
tion than an adult during a custodial interrogation in order to insure
the validity of any waiver of rights. The decision in Fare v. Vichael C.
breaks with this liberal trend by blurring the traditional legal distinction
between minors and adults in the custodial situation.
Note, Fare v. Vichael C.: Blurting the Distinctioni Between .Mlinors and .ldults in Custo-
dian Interlogations, 12 Sw. U.L. REV. 129, 129-30 (1981) (footnote omitted).
Included as factors in the totality of the circumstances test as applied in
.llichael C. were the age of the accused, the juvenile's prior experience with the
juvenile court system, the duration of the interrogation, and the methods em-
ployed therein. 442 U.S. at 725. Significantly, the Court stated that the totality
approach also includes "evaluation of the juvenile's age, experience, education,
background, and intelligence, and ... whether he has the capacity to understand
the warnings given him, the nature of his Fifth Amendment rights, and the con-
sequences of waiving those rights." Id.
57. For a discussion of the Supreme Court's approval of the totality of the
circumstances test to evaluate a juvenile's waiver, see supra notes 54-56 and ac-
companying text.
58. For a discussion of such additional protections, see infra notes 89-114
and accompanying text.
59. See, e.g., Garrett v. State, 369 So. 2d 827 (Ala. 1978); Quick v. State, 599
P.2d 712 (Alaska 1979); State v. Jackson, 118 Ariz. 270, 576 P.2d 129 (1978);
People v. Lara, 67 Cal. 2d 365, 432 P.2d 202, 62 Cal. Rptr. 586 (1967), ert.
1985] COMMENT 1245
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These courts examine the circumstances surrounding the custodial in-
terrogation on a case-by-case basis in order to determine whether the
resultant confession is valid. In evaluating the totality of the circum-
stances, these courts consider several factors: 1) the age, physical condi-
tion, intelligence, and level of education of the accused; 2) the juvenile's
prior experience with police proceedings; 3) the juvenile's access to gui-
dance by an attorney or parent; 4) the extent of the juvenile's knowledge
concerning the substance of the charges and the nature of his or her
rights; and 5) the method and length of the interrogation."0 The prem-
ise underlying this approach is that age, alone, is not determinative and
and that a juvenile is capable of making a decision to waive his constitu-
tional rights."'
Proponents of the totality of the circumstances test argue that
courts are perfectly capable of evaluating all the circumstances to make
an individual determination based on the facts applicable to that juve-
nile.6 2 Additionally, the advocates of this approach suggest that it al-
lows police the flexibility to deal differently with sophisticated juveniles
who understand their rights without the artificial constraints of a pro-
phylactic rule that is not needed by such juveniles. 63
Opponents of the totality of the circumstances approach claim that
it does not go far enough in protecting the interests of juveniles. They
argue that its "flexibility" leaves too much to judicial discretion, includ-
dewed, 392 U.S. 945 (1968); In re C. P., 411 A.2d 643 (D.C.), vacated on other
g'rowids, 449 U.S. 945 (1980); Riley v. State, 237 Ga. 124, 226 S.E.2d 922 (1976);
State v. Dillon, 93 Idaho 698, 471 P.2d 553 (1970), cert. denied, 401 U.S. 942
(1971); State v. Nicholas S., 444 A.2d 373 (Me. 1982); Commonwealth v. Cain,
361 Mass. 224, 279 N.E.2d 706 (1972); In re Welfare of M. D. S., 345 N.W.2d
723 (Minn. 1984); State v. Gullings, 244 Or. 173, 416 P.2d 311 (1966): State v.
Hnnt, 607 P.2d 297 (Utah 1980); State v. Prater, 77 Wash. 2d 526, 463 P.2d 640
(1970).
60. See, e.g., West v. United States, 399 F.2d 467, 469 (5th Cir. 1968), cert.
deied, 393 U.S. 2201 (1969).
Fhe factors to be considered and the manner in which they are weighed and
combined is a matter of judicial discretion. Id. See generally Davis,]Jvenile Rights
Dring the Pre-Judicial Process, 21 PRAC. LAW., July 15, 1975, at 23, 37 (reviewing
factors considered in determining validity of juvenile's waiver of privilege
against self-incrimination).
61. See, e.g., Quick v. State, 599 P.2d 712, 719 (Alaska 1979) (mere fact that
accused is tnder age of majority does not automatically render him incapable of
making knowing and voluntary waiver); In re C.P., 411 A.2d 643, 648-49 (D.C.)
(13-year-old is capable of waiving right to remain silent; subsequent confession
is admissible), vacated on other grounds, 449 U.S. 945 (1980); Riley v. State,
237 Ga. 124, 127-28, 226 S.E.2d 922, 925-27 (1976) (age alone is not
determinative).
62. lichael C., 442 U.S. at 725.
63. See Grisso, supra note 6, at 1138 (police could swiftly and effectively deal
with juveniles who clearly understand effect of their waiver). See also Note,
Preadjudicatory Confessions, supra note 6, at 784 ("a particularly sophisticated youth
of fourteen might be permitted to waive his fifth amendment privilege whereas a
seventeen year old with significantly less experience might not").
1246 [Vol. 30: p. 1235
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ing the selection of the factors to evaluate, and the weight to be given to
each factor.6 4  Further, those opposed to the totality of the circum-
stances test argue that it presents police with no standard by which to
model their practices. 6 5 Finally, it has been suggested that an examina-
tion of the totality of the circumstances may fail to reveal "subtle coer-
cive pressures at work against the particularly susceptible minor." 66
Many commentators rely on the results of empirical research to sup-
port their contention that juveniles, as a class, are incompetent to waive
their fifth amendment privilege against self-incrimination. 6 7 The theory
behind this contention is that when society encourages its children to be
respectful and obedient to adults, it renders juveniles unlikely to assert
their right to remain silent when confronted by the police during custo-
dial investigation. Indeed, psychological studies have shown that even
innocent minors frequently confess simply to please an adult. 68 Because
of society's emphasis on respect and obedience, juveniles are very sus-
ceptible to police pressures and subtle coercion. 69 Furthermore, some
juveniles believe that the police are omnipotent and know the juvenile is
lying; believing this, the minor may confess to avoid aggravating the sit-
uation. 7° Moreover, juveniles lack the emotional maturity of adults and
64. See, e.g., Grisso, supra note 6, at 1138-39; Note, Preadjudicatory Confessions,
supra note 6, at 784 (citing Annot., 87 A.L.R.2d 624, 631-33 (1963)). At times,
the courts' evaluations of juveniles' waivers have been based on mere specula-
tion. See, e.g., In re Dino, 359 So. 2d 685, 691 (La.), cert. denied, 439 U.S. 1047
(1978). In one commentator's view, the totality of the circumstances test "is an
oversimplification often used by courts as a crutch to avoid analysis." Note,
ll'aiver in the Juvenile Court, 68 COLUM. L. REv. 1149, 1156 n.58 (1968) [hereinaf-
ter cited as Note, Waiver in the Juvenile Court].
65. Lewis v. State, 259 Ind. 431, 440, 288 N.E.2d 138, 141 (1972) (court
adopted per se rule which was later codified at IND. CODE ANN. §§ 31-6-7-3a(l),
(2) (Burns 1979)). According to such opponents, the totality of the circum-
stances test forces the police to consider a myriad of factors and to predict the
constitutionality of their actions without guidelines. Id.
66. Comment, Pa. S. Ct. Review, supra note 6, at 711 (juveniles may fear that
non-waiver will be viewed as uncooperative attitude and that it would, therefore,
be "better" to talk with police). See also Comment, The Judicial Response to Juvenile
Confessions: An Examination of the Per Se Rule, 17 DuQ. L. REV. 659, 670 (1978-
1979) [hereinafter cited as Comment, The Judicial Response] (questioning totality
of circumstances approach because of several noted "conservative applications
of the test and disingenuous appraisals of the interrogations of juveniles").
67. Empirical studies would seem to support these commentators' opin-
ions. For a discussion of the results of empirical research, see infra notes 76-88
and accompanying text.
68. For a further discussion of methods of eliciting confessions and their
psychological and practical effects on juveniles, see generally Driver, Confessions
and the Social Psychology of Coercion, 82 HARV. L. REV. 42 (1968); Ferguson & Doug-
las, A Study of Juvenile ll'aiver, 7 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 39 (1970); Ferster & Courtless,
The Beginning ofJuvenile Justice, Police Practices, and the Juvenile Offender, 22 VAND. L.
REV. 567 (1969). See also Grisso, supra note 6; Comment, The Interrogated Juven ile:
Caveat Confessor?, 24 HASTINGS L.J. 413 (1973).
69. Comment, supra note 68, at 419-20.
70. Note, The Admissibility of Juvenile Confessions: Is an Intelligent and Knowing
COMMENT 12471985]
13
Shaffner: Around and Around on Pennsylvania's Juvenile Confession Carousel:
Published by Villanova University Charles Widger School of Law Digital Repository, 1985
VILLANOVA LAW REVIEW [Vol. 30: p. 1235
may, therefore, be more susceptible to confess either in response to
feelings of guilt imposed by the police or in an effort to end the trau-
matic interrogation. 7 1 Finally, minors in custodial interrogation fre-
quently confess not only to the offense being investigated, but also to
other offenses of which the police were unaware. 72 As a result of these
characteristics, the courts have come to realize that juveniles' confes-
sions are often inaccurate and unreliable. 73
Apart from the unreliability ofjuveniles' confessions, these confes-
sions are also suspect because of concern for the mental capabilities of
juveniles. Because of their immaturity and lack of experience, juveniles
may lack the mental capacity to understand the nature of their rights or
to comprehend the consequences of a waiver of those rights.7 4 Addi-
tionally, once a juvenile has waived those rights and proceeded to talk
with the police, he may not be sophisticated enough to know how or
when to halt the questioning by invoking his rights. 75
2. Empirical Studies
The observations of courts and commentators that juveniles do not
comprehend their constitutional rights or the consequences of a waiver
of those rights are supported by empirical studies. In 1969, the re-
searchers of one empirical study concluded that only a small percentage
Waiver of Constitutional Rights Possible Without Adult Guidance?, 34 U. PIrr. L. REV.
321, 326 (1972).
71. Comment, The Judicial Response, supra note 66, at 673. Indeed,juveniles
hattie a strong psychological temptation to confess falselv in order to be free
from the pressure of interrogation. See COUNCIL OF THE JU1DGES OF THE NA-
TIONAl. COUNCIl. ON CRIME AND DELINQUENCY, MODEL. RULES FOR JUVENILE
COUR's 54 (1969) (rule 25 and accompanying commentary).
72. Long, Headaches of a Judge-A Challeige to the Bar, 27 WASH. L. REx,. 130,
135 (1952).
73. See, e.g., It re Gault, 387 U.S. 1, 55 (1967) (citation omitted). As the
Supreme Court explained in Gault:
Simply stated, the Court's decision in this case rests upon the con-
sidered opinion-after nearly four busy years on the Juvenile Court
bench during which the testimony of thousands of such juveniles has
been heard-that the statements of adolescents under 18 years of age
who are arrested and charged with violations of law are frequently un-
trustworthy and often distort the truth.
Id. Traditionally, courts have viewed confessions elicited from the interrogation
of a juvenile with heightened scrutiny. See 3J. WIGMORE, TRE.ArISE ON Ev'IDENCE
§ 822 (3d ed. 1940). Often a prerequisite to the admissibility ofjuvenile confes-
sions has been corroboration of the confession. See, e.g., State v. Boswick. 4 Del.
(4 Harr.) 563 (1847); UNIFORM JUVENILE COURT Acr § 27B (extrajudicial state-
ment by minor needs corroboration by other evidence in order to support adju-
dication of delinquency).
74. See Note, Waiver i iihe Juvenile Court, supra note 64, at 1163.
75. See Note, supra note 70, at 326-27 n.39 (quoting People v. Burton, 6 Cal.
3d 375, 380, 491 P.2d 793, 797, 99 Cal. Rptr. 1, 5 (1972) ("It is fatuous to
assume that a minor in custody will be in a position to call on an attorney for
assistance.")).
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of juveniles are capable of understanding their Miranda rights or of
knowingly and intelligently waiving them. 76 Furthermore, a simplified
version of the Miranda warnings did not significantly increase the
juveniles' understanding. 77
A more recent empirical study sought to determine whether
juveniles, as compared with adults, understand the actual words and
phrases of the Miranda warnings and whether they understand the func-
tion and significance of the rights conveyed by the warnings.78 The re-
sults of this study buttressed the belief that juveniles are incapable of
understanding and constitutionally waiving their fifth amendment rights
against self-incrimination. Several significant findings were reported in
this study.7'
1) Juveniles demonstrated less comprehension than adults of the
actual Miranda rights.80
2) Juveniles demonstrated less understanding than adults of the
meaning of the words used in the Miranda warnings.8 '
3) Juveniles, more than adults, misunderstood the right to counsel
(i.e., the right to consult an attorney prior to interrogation and to have
counsel present during interrogation). 82
4) Juveniles, like adults, generally understood the role of the at-
76. Ferguson & Douglas, supra note 68, at 54. The researchers interviewed
ninety juveniles to assess their understanding of both the usual Viranda warn-
ings and a simplified version of the Miranda warnings. Id. at 40.
The Ferguson and Douglas study has been criticized by a subsequent re-
searcher for its small sample size, lack of objective scoring criteria, and failure to
employ statistical tests to establish the significance of its results. See Grisso, supra
note 6, at 1143 n.50. Presumably, the Grisso study was structured so as to cor-
rect for these inadequacies. For a discussion of the Grisso Study, see infra notes
77-88 and accompanying text.
77. Ferguson & Davis, supra note 68, at 54.
78. Pomicter and Grisso, Two-Year Study of Interrogation ofJuveniles and
Understanding of Miranda Warnings: Summary of Results (National Juvenile
Law Center, St. Louis, Mo., 1978) (unpublished manuscript). See generallv
Grisso, supra note 6 (discussing sample size, research methods, statistical analy-
ses, and findings of two-year study).
79. See Grisso, supra note 6. Multiple measures or tests were used to elimi-
nate interpretive errors. Id. at 1144.
80. Id. at 1152-54. Only 21% of the juveniles had a perfect score, while
42% of the adults achieved this result. Id. at 1153. Of the adults, 23% had an
inadequate understanding of at least one of the Miranda warnings, in contrast to
55% of the juveniles. Id. at 1153-54.
81. Id. at 1154. The subjects were tested on the following crucial words:
"consult," "attorney," "interrogation," "appoint," "entitled," and "right." Id.
While 60% of the adults achieved the highest possible scores in their under-
standing of the words contained in the Miranda warnings, only 33% of the
juveniles achieved such scores. Id. At least one of the crucial words contained in
the Viranda warnings was completely misunderstood by 63% of the juveniles as
compared to 37% of the adults. Id.
82. Id. While 45% of the juveniles gave inadequate descriptions of the
wording regarding the right to counsel, only 15% of the adults failed to ade-
quately describe this right. Id. The right to consult an attorney during "interro-
15
Shaffner: Around and Around on Pennsylvania's Juvenile Confession Carousel:
Published by Villanova University Charles Widger School of Law Digital Repository, 1985
VILLANOVA LAW REVIEW
torney in the setting of a police interrogation. 3
5) Although most juveniles understood the meaning of the right
to remain silent,8 4 many did not understand the comprehensiveness of
this right, believing that they could later be penalized for invoking their
right to silence8 5 and that, if questioned by a judge, they would have to
explain their criminal involvement."
6) Juveniles younger than fifteen years old and fifteen- to sixteen-
year-olds with low I.Q. scores had significantly poorer comprehension
of their Miranda rights than adults.
8 7
7) Sixteen-year-old juveniles with I.Q.'s of 80 or above under-
stood their rights as well as did older juveniles and young adults.!
3. The Per Se Rule
Some jurisdictions, dissatisfied with the protection afforded a juve-
nile by the totality of the circumstances approach, have adopted a per se
rule requiring the participation of a parent or of some other interested
adult in the juvenile's waiver of the privilege against self-incrimina-
tion. '  This rule is based on the presumption that a juvenile is incapa-
gation" was commonly misconstrued as the right to consult an attorney at an
adjudicatory hearing. Id.
83. Id. at 1158. Of the juveniles, 80% gave adequate responses, indicating
their comprehension of the role of attorney in defending the suspect against the
police and in providing advice. Id. Only 28% of the juveniles thought that at-
torneys owed a duty to the juvenile courts which would interfere with the attor-
ney-client relationship. Id.
84. Id. at 1154. The right to remain silent was recognized by 89% of the
juveniles. Id.
85. Id. at 1158. Misunderstanding the right to remain silent, 62% of the
juveniles believed that they could be penalized by a judge for invoking the right
to silence. Id. Moreover, 24% of the juveniles, as compared to 9% of the adults,
did not understand that a confession could later be used against them in court.
Id. at 1154.
86. Id. at 1158-59. Of the juveniles, 55% held this incorrect belief. Id.
87. Id. at 1157, 1159-60, 1164-65. This finding suggests that any waiver by
juveniles younger than 15 should be excluded because the waiver probably was
not made knowingly. Id. at 1160-61.
88. Id. at 1160. Although some older juveniles performed better in the
study, the significance of this finding is limited. Id. at 1164-65. First, the study
did not measure juveniles' abilities during actual interrogation proceedings, and
thus it did not test juveniles' ability to withstand intimidating police interroga-
tion. Id. at 1165. Second, the older juveniles' level of understanding was mcas-
sured against an "adult" standard which was still significantly less than complete
comprehension. Id. The researcher concluded that the deficiencies in juvenile
comprehension of fifth amendment rights mandated extra protection for
juveniles who are subject to custodial interrogation. Id. at 1166. The author
strongly advocated the use of a per se exclusionary rule. For a discussion of the
per se rule, see infra notes 89-110 and accompanying text.
89. Several states have adopted such a per se rule by statute. See, e.g., COLO.
REV. STAT. § 19-2-102(3)(C)(I) (Supp. 1984); CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 46(b)-
137(a) (West Supp. 1984); IND. CODE ANN. §§ 31-6-7-3a(l), (2) (Burns 1979);
IOWA CODE ANN. § 232.11 (West 1985); MONT. CODE ANN. § 41-5-303 (1983);
1250 [Vol. 30: p. 1235
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ble of waiving his or her constitutional rights without the assistance of
an adult. 90 The most protective features of this rule require that an
adult who is "interested" in the juvenile's welfare (parent, attorney, or
other adult) be advised of the juvenile's constitutional rights and that
the juvenile and the adult have an opportunity to consult with one an-
other prior to the waiver. 91 Under the per se rule, waivers made without
these protections are automatically excluded. 92 Once the court is satis-
fied that the protections have been afforded, it may still conduct a tradi-
tional totality of the circumstances test, if there is any doubt that the
waiver was voluntary, knowing, and intelligent. 9 'i
The need for an adult and the resultant per se rule are justified
partly because of the vulnerability of juveniles.9 4 The presence of an
adult provides those elements of maturity, mental capabilities, and expe-
rience that a juvenile lacks. 9 5 A second justification for the rule lies in
N.M. STAT. ANN. § 32-1-27 (1978); OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 10, § 1109(a) (West
1984-1985).
Such a rule has also been recognized by court decision. See, e.g., Lewis v.
State, 259 Ind. 431, 288 N.E.2d 138 (1972) (superseded by IND. CODE ANN.§§ 31-6-7-3a(1), (2) (Burns 1979)); In reJ.A.N., 346 N.W.2d 495 (Iowa 1984); In
re K.W.B., 500 S.W.2d 275 (Mo. Ct. App. 1973); In re Dino, 359 So. 2d 586 (La.),
cert. denied, 438 U.S. 1047 (1978); Commonwealth v. Smith, 472 Pa. 492, 372
A.2d 797 (1977).
This rule has been proposed by drafters of juvenile court standards. See
JOINT COMM'N ON JUVENILE JUSTICE STANDARDS, INST. OF JUDICIAL ADMIN. &
ABA, STANDARDS RELATING TO POLICE HANDLING OF JUVENILE PROBLEMS 54
(1980) (parent or adult required for valid waiver of juvenile's constitutional
rights); Piersma, Ganousis & Kramer, ModelJuvenile Act, 20 ST. Louis U.L.J. 1, 29
(1975); U.S. DEP'T OF HEALTH, EDUC. & WELFARE, LEGISLATIVE GUIDE FOR
DRAFTING FAMILY AND JUVENILE COURT ACTS § 26 (Pub. No. 472 1969).
90. See, e.g., In re Dino, 359 So. 2d 586, 594 (La.), cert. denied, 438 U.S. 1048
(1978).
91. See, e.g., Lewis v. State, 259 Ind. 431, 439, 288 N.E.2d 138, 142 (1972)
(superseded by IND. CODE ANN. §§ 31-6-7-3a(1), (2) (Burns 1979)); In re Dino,
359 So. 2d 586, 594 (La.), cert. denied, 439 U.S. 1047 (1978).
92. See generally Comment, The Judicial Response, supra note 66.
93. See, e.g., In re L.B., 33 Colo. App. 1, 4, 513 P.2d 1069, 1070 (1973)
(waiver invalid where accused's father was also incarcerated at time of waiver);
Daniels v. State, 226 Ga. 269, 273, 174 S.E.2d 422, 424 (1970) (waiver invalid
where mother of accused was intoxicated when waiver was made).
94. See, e.g., In re K.W.B., 500 S.W.2d 275, 282 (Mo. Ct. App. 1973) (Mi-
randa protections may be inadequate because juvenile is incapable of under-
standing his constitutional rights and consequences of any waiver).
95. Note, supra note 70, at 327. It is thought that a parent will provide the
added assurances and assistance that will result in a knowing and intelligent
waiver of the Miranda rights. See generally Note, Preadjudicatory Confessions, sipra
note 6.
If the studies conducted on adults' waivers of Miranda rights are equally
applicable when adults advise juveniles, such a prophylactic rule would not ma-
terially reduce the number ofjuvenile confessions since most adults waive their
own rights and speak freely with the police. Note, supra note 70, at 327-28 (cit-
ing Seeburger and Wettick, Miranda in Pittsburgh: A Statistical Study, 29 U. Prr. L.
REV. 1 (1967)); Interrogations in New Haven: The Impact of Miranda, 76 YALE L.J.
1519 (1967).
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the fact that the goal of the juvenile justice system is rehabilitation
rather than retribution.!"! Some courts believe that there is a greater
likelihood of rehabilitating juveniles when the minor views the justice
system as fair.1 7 This perception can be enhanced if the juvenile is pro-
vided with adult assistance when confronted by the police.!8 A final rea-
son supporting the per se rule is that the requirement of adult assistance
provides a clear guideline for acceptable police interrogation proce-
dures. Under the per se rule, the police are no longer forced to specu-
late about whether a court will later admit the confession. ' Rather,
absent a lack of voluntariness, ajuvenile waiver is admissible if it is made
after consultation with an interested and informed adult."", It is signifi-
cant that the parental consent required under the per se rule is consis-
tent with parental consent requirements regarding other decisions
concerning juveniles.' 1
96. For a discussion of the philosophy underlying the juvenile justice sys-
tem, see supra notes 25-36 and accompanying text.
97. In re Gault, 387 U.S. at 26. The Court in Gault recognized the histori-
cally informal and paternalistic approach of the juvenile courts. Id. The Court
noted that studies have shown that fairness engenders a much more impressive
and therapeutic attitude in a penalized juvenile thereby garnering the minor's
assistance rather than resistance to the rehabilitative effort. Id. (citation
omitted).
98. Since rehabilitation should begin as soon as a minor comes into contact
with the juvenile justice system, the minor's initial impression must be one of
fairness so that the system will not inculcate in the juvenile a disrespect for au-
thority. Davis, Justice for the Juvenile: The Decision to Arest and Due Process, 1971
DUKE L.J. 913, 924.
99. Lewis v. State, 259 Ind. 531, 436, 440, 288 N.E.2d 138, 141, 142 (1972)
(superseded by IND. CODE ANN. §§ 31-6-7-3a(I), (2) (Burns 1979)).
100. Id.
101. Id. In many states, for example, a minor may not sue or be stied alone.
Harris, Children's Vaiver of Miranda Rights and the Supreme Court's Decisions in
Parham, Bellotti, and Fare, 10 N.M.L. REV. 379, 379 (1980). A child may also need
parental approval to receive medical or dental treatment, to donate blood, or to
be tattooed. Note, supra note 70, at 321.
Presumably, a child's decision to waive constitutional rights, thereby facing
possible imprisonment, is just as important as deciding whether to be tattooed
and thus the child should similarly be afforded the benefit of parental consulta-
tion, advice, and consent. As one commentator has observed:
The decision to waive Miranda rights is in essence a relinquishment of
the basic right to resist state intervention into one's life and represents
agreement to cooperate by producing powerful evidence of criminal
conduct against oneself .... The decision is particularly difficult be-
cause, to make a wise choice, the suspect must be able to relate the
abstract warnings to the reality of the potential consequences of a
waiver in a later criminal prosecution .... The practical consequences,
then, of decisions to waive Miranda rights can be as great as the conse-
quences of decisions to have an abortion or to forego mental
hospitalization.
Harris, supra, at 405-06 (footnotes omitted). Such decisions should be made
only with the benefit of mature thought and analysis.
At least one commentator has also noted the parents' interest in advising
their child regarding waiver of Miranda rights. Id. at 401. If the parents are
18
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Those opposed to the per se rule argue that it neither eliminates
speculation nor provides clear standards to guide the police. 111 Critics
have observed that under the per se rule, the courts and police must
evaluate whether the parent was "interested," whether the warnings
were understood by the parent, and whether the juvenile and parent
consulted after the parent was advised of the juvenile's rights. I"' Such a
determination usually requires inquiry into the totality of the circum-
stances, thereby subsuming part of the value of the parental consulta-
tion requirement. In addition, the value of the presence of a parent as a
protector of the child's rights has been questioned because studies have
shown that parents often are no more able than juveniles to make a
knowing and intelligent waiver. 104 Moreover, the parental requirement
has been regarded as worthless insofar as the parent fails to advise the
child or insofar as the parent advises the child not to withhold any infor-
mation from the authorities.' 0 5
Critics also have argued that the per se rule is far too restrictive of
police activities. 10 6 First, criminal investigations may be slowed while
the police attempt to locate the parents of a juvenile.' 0 7 Second, the
rigidity of the rule may result in the suppression of confessions that
would have been admissible under an evaluation of the totality of the
circumstances. Is It is argued, therefore, that the rule is overly protec-
tive of sophisticated juveniles who are competent to independently
denied the opportunity to advise their child, "[the parents will] lose a significant
opportunity to assert their rights to custody and control of [their child] and to
inculcate him with their values." Id.
102. See generally Comment, The Judicial Response, supra note 66, at 692-84.
103. See id.
104. Id. The value of the presence of a parent has also been questioned
because the parent's presence may not be in the minor's best interests, the juve-
nile may confess to avoid parental disapproval, or the parent's own judgment
may be negatively influenced by the parent's embarrassment or anger at the ju-
venile's predicament. Comment, Interrogation of Juveniles: The Right to a Parent's
Presence, 77 DICK. L. REV. 543, 555-56 (1973). A parent may be hostile or uncar-
ing, thereby negating the potential benefit of an "interested" adult's advice. See
Note, Preadjudicatowy Confessions, supra note 6, at 783. For this reason, one com-
mentator has supported a proposal requiring the presence of an attorney prior
to a juvenile waiver. Id.
105. See Grisso, supra note 6, at 1163. One study indicated that 75% of the
participating parents felt children should never withhold information from the
police. Id. (citing Grisso & Ring, Parents'Attitudes TowardJuvenile's Rights in Inter-
rogation, 7 CRIM. JUST. & BEHAV. 211 (1979)).
106. See, e.g., Fare v. Michael C., 442 U.S. 707, 725-26 (1979) (recognizing
the state's interest in not imposing rigid restraints on the police).
107. See Note, Preadjudicatory Confessions, supra note 6, at 782 n.32. Propo-
nents of the rule have countered with the argument that although the police
inquiry must be halted until a parent is contacted, most parents are in fact lo-
cated within a reasonable time. Id.
108, Comment, The Judicial Response, supra note 66, at 682.
19851 1253
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waive their rights.l° 9 Third, those opposed to the prophylactic effect of
the per se rule claim that it is an overzealous attempt to protect juveniles
and that it ignores or undervalues the competing need to protect the
public from crime. I 10
4. Supplementary Protections for Juveniles
Some jurisdictions, reasoning that the presence of a parent is not
enough protection for the juvenile, have adopted supplementary protec-
tions to the per se rule. One such protection is the requirement of the
presence of an attorney during the custodial interrogation. Ill Advo-
cates of such an approach argue that a juvenile's non-waivable right to
an attorney will ensure that the juvenile's waiver of his or her fifth
amendment privilege against self-incrimination will be knowing and in-
telligent and compensate for the shortcomings of the per se rule with
respect to inadequate advice by parents.' 12 Still other jurisdictions have
provided additional protections to the per se rule in the form of pre-
sumptions of inadmissibility rebuttable only by proof beyond a reason-
able doubt' 1 3 and statutory directives requiring the police to take
juveniles before the juvenile court immediately upon arrest. 1 14
IV. PENNSYLVANIA COURTS AND JUVENILE CONFESSIONS
The Pennsylvania Supreme Court has authored numerous fre-
109. See Fare v. Michael C., 442 U.S. 707, 725-26 (1979). For a further
discussion of Michael C., see supra notes 54-56.
110. See Comment, The Judicial Response, supra note 66, at 682, The interest
of the state in protecting the public from criminal offenses has generally not
been considered by the courts that have set forth the per se rule. Id. But see In re
Thompson, 241 N.W.2d 2, 5 (Iowa 1976) ("It is apparent most courts, required
to deal pragmatically with an ever-mounting crime wave in which minors play a
disproportionate role, have considered society's self-preservation interest in re-
jecting a blanket exclusion for juvenile confession.").
111. See, e.g., TEX. FAM. CODE ANN. § 51.09 (Vernon Supp. 1980). See gener-
ally Grisso, supra note 6, at 1163-64 (recommending such requirement for
juveniles under age of fifteen).
112. See JOINT COMM'N ON JUVENILE JUSTICE STANDARDS, INST. OF JUDICIAL
ADMIN. & ABA, STANDARDS RELATING TO PRETRIAL COURT PROCEEDINGS 89
(1980) (juvenile's statements inadmissible in absence of previous advice of
counsel).
113. See, e.g., Garner v. State, 500 P.2d 1340 (Okla. Crim. App. 1972);
MODEL CODE OF PRE-ARRAIGNMENT PROCEDURES § 5.07 (1975).
114. See, e.g., FLA. STAT. ANN. § 39.03 (West Supp. 1985); GA. CODE ANN.
§ 15-11-19 (1985); MICH. STAT. ANN. § 764.27 (Callaghan 1978); Mo. ANN. STAT.
§ 211.061 (Vernon 1983); N.Y. FAM. CT. ACT § 724 (McKinney 1983).
An otherwise voluntary confession will be excluded if such statutory re-
quirements are violated. See, e.g., Roberts v. State, 285 So. 2d 384 (Fla. 1973);
Crawford v. State, 240 Ga. 321, 240 S.E.2d 824 (1977); J.J. v. State, 135 Ga.
App. 660, 218 S.E.2d 668 (1975); People v. Wolff, 23 Mich. App. 550, 179
N.W.2d 206 (1970); State v. Wade, 531 S.W.2d 726 (Mo. 1976); In re Anthony
E., 72 A.D.2d 699, 421 N.Y.S.2d 566 (1979).
[Vol. 30: p. 12351254
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quently cited opinions on the issue of a juvenile's waiver of his or her
privilege against self-incrimination.' 15 Until ten years ago, the Penn-
sylvania courts routinely employed the totality of the circumstances test
to determine the validity of a juvenile's waiver.' 16 Then, the court
shifted towards, and eventually adopted, a per se rule. 17 After defining
and interpreting the parameters of the per se rule, the court gradually
relaxed the rule's rigid requirements.' II Recently, however, the court
has completely abandoned the per se rule and reverted to the use of the
totality of the circumstances test.' 19 The following discussion will trace
the metamorphosis of the court's approach to juveniles' waivers of con-
stitutional rights.
A. Pennsylvania's Totality of the Circumstances Approach
Traditionally, the Pennsylvania Supreme Court espoused an evalua-
tion of the totality of the circumstances when determining whether a
waiver and subsequent confession were valid.12 0 Although cognizant of
the fact that a juvenile defendant should not be judged by the more ex-
acting standards applicable to a mature adult, the court nevertheless
continued to decide whether a juvenile's waiver was voluntary and intel-
ligent by looking to all the circumstances surrounding the waiver.12 1
Applying this standard in Commonwealth v. Darden,12 2 the Pennsylvania
Supreme Court concluded that a fifteen-year-old defendant, Darden,
had knowingly and understandingly waived his constitutional right to
115. For a discussion of several of these opinions, see infra notes 120-168
and accompanying text. These Pennsylvania cases have been cited as authority
by advocates of divergent positions concerning the Pennsylvania Supreme
Court's historical adherence to, subsequent rejection of, and recent readoption
of the totality of the circumstances test. Compare Note, supra note 70, at 328 ("It
is not likely.., that the [Pennsylvania] [S]upreme [C]ourt will give up its right to
judicial discretion in this issue or that the majority will change its opinion on the
'sophistication' of the average sixteen-year-old.") with Comment, Pa. S. Ct. Re-
view, supra note 6, at 709-10 ("The [Pennsylvania Supreme C]ourt's adoption of
a per se rule is in accord with the progressive trend in American jurisprudence
•.. it should be viewed as a significant step toward the meaningful protection of
juveniles.").
116. For a discussion of this earlier use of the totality of the circumstances
test, see infra notes 120-128 and accompanying text.
117. For a discussion of the formulation of the per se rule, see ilfra notes
129-148 and accompanying text.
118. For a discussion of this gradual change, see infra notes 149-160 and
accompanying text.
119. For a discussion of the court's return to the totality of the circum-
stances test, see infra notes 161-168 and accompanying text.
120. See, e.g., Commonwealth v. Harmon, 440 Pa. 195, 269 A.2d 744 (1970)
(affirming trial court's finding that facts surrounding challenged confession dis-
closed police tactics court could not condone). For a general discussion of the
totality of the circumstances test, see supra notes 59-66 and accompanying text.
121. See, e.g., Commonwealth v. Darden, 441 Pa. 41, 271 A.2d 257 (1970),
cert. denied, 401 U.S. 1004 (1971).
122. 441 Pa. 41, 271 A.2d 257 (1970), cert. denied, 401 U.S. 1004 (1971).
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remain silent. 123 Darden had given an incriminating statement after two
and one-half hours of police questioning and after four hours of police
custody. 124 The court stated that Darden should not "be judged by the
more exacting standards of maturity" but concluded that all of the cir-
cumstances indicated that his waiver had been knowing and
voluntary. 1
25
In Commonwealth v. Moses, 1'26 the Pennsylvania Supreme Court reaf-
firmed the totality of the circumstances test as the appropriate method
for evaluating the validity of ajuvenile's waiver. 1'2 7 The court reiterated
its previous determination that a waiver by a juvenile must be scruti-
nized with special care and reasoned that adoption of a per se rule
"would be to ignore reality and the sophistication of the average six-
123. 441 Pa. at 48, 271 A.2d at 260. Darden was involved in one of several
fights that erupted in a high school parking lot following a baseball game. Id. at
42, 271 A.2d at 258. During one of the fights, another youth was fatally stabbed.
Id. Darden was ultimately convicted of the murder. Id. at 43, 271 A.2d at 258.
124. Id. at 44-45, 271 A.2d at 258-59. Darden admitted unintentionally
stabbing the victim. Id. at 45-46, 271 A.2d at 259. Darden was given the Mli-
randa warnings twice, once shortly after being detained, and once after being
confined in a holding cell from 2:00 a.m. until 3:00 a.m. Id. After each warning,
Darden was asked if he understood the warnings, and he replied in the affirma-
tive. Id. Immediately thereafter, police interrogation ensued. Id.
The evidence indicated that Darden had been drinking alcohol that evening.
Id. Furthermore, the testimony of a psychologist indicated that Darden had an
I.Q. of 76, a level revealing mild retardation and functioning equivalent to that
of an average youth of 8 to 11 2 years. Id. at 47, 271 A.2d at 259-60.
125. Id. at 48, 271 A.2d at 260. The court noted that a reading of Darden's
own testimony showed that he had the requisite ability to understand his rights;
the trial court had described him as "remarkably alert, aware and responsive."
Id. at 48 n.3, 271 A.2d at 260 n.3. At another point in the opinion, the court
explained that it was significant that Darden did not deny that he was given ie
Miranda warnings, and even more significantly that he never said nor indicated
that he did not understand the warnings. Id. at 47-48, 271 A.2d at 259-60.
The dissenting opinion argued that Darden could not have waived his rights
without first obtaining advice from an adult friend or counsel. Id. at 52, 271
A.2d at 262 (RobertsJ., dissenting). Justice Roberts concluded that, under the
totality of the circumstances, Darden was incapable of understanding and mak-
ing a knowing waiver of his rights. Id. at 53, 291 A.2d at 263-64 (Roberts, J.,
dissenting). Justice Roberts pointed out the recognized immaturity ofjuveniles
espoused by the United States Supreme Court in Haley, and Gallegos. Id. at 54-55,
271 A.2d at 264 (Roberts, J., dissenting). For a discussion of Haley,, see supra
notes 37-42 and accompanying text. For a discussion of Ga//egos, see sipra notes
43-47 and accompanying text.
126. 446 Pa. 350, 287 A.2d 131 (1971). See generally Note, supra note 70
(discussing Moses).
127. 446 Pa. at 351, 287 A.2d at 132. In Moses, the defendant argued that a
juvenile lacks the ability to fully understand and assert his or her constitutional
rights, thus rendering invalid any waiver given by a juvenile in the absence of
adult advice. Id. at 354, 287 A.2d at 133. The sixteen-year-old defendant, Leo-
nard Moses, was convicted of murder. Id. at 351, 287 A.2d at 132. In reaffirm-
ing the totality of the circumstances rule, the court explained that the validity of
a waiver depends on all of the attendant circumstances, including the age, ma-
turity, and intelligence of the accused. Id. at 354, 287 A.2d at 132.
1256
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teen-year-old in these days and times."' 128
B. Fashioning a Per Se Rule in Pennsylvania
The first in a trilogy of Pennsylvania cases that developed a per se
exclusionary rule for juvenile waivers made in the absence of adult gui-
dance was Commonwealth v. Roane. 129 In that case, sixteen-year-old Daryl
Roane was arrested at his home for robbery and murder. 131 His mother
followed him to the police station but was denied access to her son and
the opportunity to speak with him alone. 1 3 ' The supreme court sup-
pressed thejuvenile's confession, holding that when a parent refuses to
allow the child to be questioned, the state bears a heavy burden to prove
that any waiver by the child was knowing and voluntary. 1 3 2 The court
stated that "[an important factor in establishing that ajuvenile's waiver
128. Id. at 354, 287 A.2d at 133. Examining the attendant circumstances,
the court concluded that Moses, a tenth-grade student with average intelligence,
had validly waived his rights and that his subsequent statements were admissi-
ble. Id. at 355, 287 A.2d at 133.
Justice Roberts, in a lengthy dissent, strongly objected to the majority's as-
sumptions concerning the average sixteen-year-old. Id. at 356-57, 287 A.2d at
135-36 (Roberts, J., dissenting). Justice Roberts stated that, in rejecting the
proferred per se rule, the majority had put forth a new per se rule, that the
"average" sixteen-year-old is capable of waiving constitutional rights. Id. at 360,
287 A.2d at 135-36 (Roberts, J., dissenting). Justice Roberts observed that
"[t]he need for adult guidance when juveniles are called upon to decide whether
to surrender their Miranda rights has been universally recognized by leading
commentators" and therefore he supported the adoption of a rule requiring
adult guidance prior to an effective juvenile waiver. Id. at 368, 287 A.2d at 140
(Roberts, J.. dissenting) (citations omitted).
After Voses, the Pennsylvania Supreme Court continued to adhere for about
two years to the totality of the circumstances test for evaluating the validity of a
juvenile waiver. See Commonwealth v. Riggins, 451 Pa. 519, 304 A.2d 473
(1973): Commonwealth v. Youngblood, 453 Pa. 225, 307 A.2d 922 (1973);
Commonwealth v. Porter, 449 Pa. 153, 295 A.2d 311 (1972).
129. 459 Ila. 389, 329 A.2d 286 (1974) (overruled by Commonwealth v.
Williams, 504 Pa. 511, 475 A.2d 1283 (1984)).
130. Id. at 391-92, 329 A.2d at 287.
131. Id. When Darvl was arrested at his home, his mother informed the
police that she would be following them to the station. Id. When Mrs. Roane
arrived at the station, she was given no information concerning her son's where-
abouts. Id. Over an hour later, she saw her son in the hall and attempted to talk
to him, but was denied the opportunity because Darvl was taken away to another
room. Id. After approximately another hour, she saw her son being led to an-
other interrogation room, which Mrs. Roane entered uninvited. Id. Mrs. Roane
was allowed to speak to her son, but only if she kept her voice loud enough for
the police to hear what she was saying. Id. The police ignored her repeated
requests that an attorney be present and that the police not take a statement
from her son. 1d.
132. Id. at 393, 329 A.2d at 288. The court expressly followed the reason-
ing of the United States Supreme Court in Gault, noting that the greatest care
must be taken to assure that an admission by a juvenile is voluntarv and "not the
product of ignorance of rights, or an adolescent fantasy, fright or despair." Id.
(quoting In re Gault, 387 U.S. at 55). For a discussion of Ganlt, see supra notes
48-51 and accompanying text.
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was a knowing and intelligent one would be evidence that, before he
made his decision to waive those rights, he had access to the advice of a
parent, attorney, or other adult who was primarily interested in his
welfare." 133
Shortly thereafter in Commonwealth v. Starkes,134 the court held that
in order for a juvenile to validly waive his right against self-incrimination
when his parent is present, the parent must be advised of the child's
rights prior to the waiver. 13 5 Without such a requirement, the court
pointed out, the juvenile would be advised by an uninformed adult,
which would thereby make the requirement of the adult's presence
meaningless. 313
In Commonwealth v. McCutchen, 13 7 the Pennsylvania Supreme Court
held that the confession of a fifteen-year-old should be suppressed when
the confession was given without the benefit of parental or interested
133. 459 Pa. at 394, 329 A.2d at 288. The court relied on the United States
Supreme Court's reasoning in Gallegos that without adult guidance, a juvenile,
because of his or her diminished mental abilities and immaturity, is not able to
understand and to assert constitutional rights or to realize the consequences of
failing to do so. Id. (quoting Gallegos, 390 U.S. at 54-55). For a discussion of
Gallegos, see supra notes 43-47 and accompanying text.
Justice Eagens, in a dissenting opinion in Roane, argued that the majority's
prophylactic rule was unrealistic and overlooked the actual determination that
should have been made-whether Daryl, tinder the totality of the circumstances,
had waived his rights. 459 Pa. at 397, 329 A.2d at 289-90 (Eagens, J., dissent-
ing). Justice Eagens concluded that Daryl had in fact knowingly waived his
rights, and that the fact that an adult expressed a different view should not affect
the ability of a sixteen-year-old to waive such rights. Id. at 398, 329 A.2d at 290
(Eagens, J., dissenting).
134. 461 Pa. 178, 335 A.2d 698 (1975) (overruled by Commonwealth v.
Williams, 504 Pa. 511, 475 A.2d 1283 (1984)).
135. Id. at 189, 335 A.2d at 703. In Starkes, the defendant made an inculpa-
tory statement to the police after conferring with his mother. Id. at 188-89, 335
A.2d at 703. Initially, the defendant had denied any involvement in a robbery-
murder the police were investigating. Id. His mother had not been informed of
her son's constitutional rights prior to her conversation with her son. Id. Dur-
ing the conversation, defendant's mother encouraged him to tell the truth. Id.
In assessing the voluntariness of the juvenile's waiver, the court considered
all of the attendant facts and circumstances, including the accused's age, intelli-
gence, and mental and physical development. Id. at 185, 335 A.2d at 701. The
court again stressed the importance of prior adult advice in determining
whether ajuvenile's waiver was knowing and intelligent. Id. at 185-86, 335 A.2d
at 701. Such advice would compensate for ajuvenile's immaturity that "deprives
[him] of the sober judgment possessed by the average adult." Id. at 186, 335
A.2d at 702. Because the defendant's mother was not informed of her son's
rights prior to her urging him to tell the truth, his statements were held inadmis-
sible. Id. at 188-89, 335 A.2d at 703.
136. Id. at 188-89, 335 A.2d at 703. The court viewed the advice of an
uninformed adult as meaningless because the child receiving such advice would
be given the illusion of protection, but would in fact be relying on someone
incapable of protecting his or her rights. Id. Again, the dissent argued that
waiver of constitutional rights was a matter of individual choice. Id. at 190-91,
335 A.2d at 704 (Eagen,J., dissenting).
137. 463 Pa. 90, 343 A.2d 669 (1975), cert. denied, 424 U.S. 934 (1976).
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adult guidance.13 8 The court concluded that its decision in Roane man-
dated consultation with a parent prior to an effective waiver by a
juvenile. 13 9
Shortly after McCutchen, the court seemed to vacillate on whether to
retain a per se rule. 140 In Commonwealth v. Webster, 14 1 the court ruled
that the police may not interfere with a juvenile's consultation with his
or her parent, and, moreover, that the police must make a reasonable
effort to provide a minor with the opportunity to confer with an inter-
ested and informed adult before waiving his or her rights.142 In a foot-
note, however, the court rejected a rule that would automatically
exclude a juvenile's confession if the police had obtained it in the ab-
sence of such advice.14 3
In spite of the language of the Pennsylvania Supreme Court in Web-
ster, Pennsylvania courts thereafter routinely excluded confessions ob-
tained from a juvenile who was not afforded an opportunity to consult
with a parent or other interested adult prior to waiving his or her consti-
tutional rights. 144 The supreme court also proceeded to refine and
138. 463 Pa. at 92, 343 A.2d at 670. In McCutchen, the defendant was con-
victed of murder and sodomy. Id. During custodial interrogation, the defendant
had made two confessions. Id. He had been permitted to speak with his mother
only before giving the second confession. Id.
139. Id. The court summarily rejected the Commonwealth's argument that
the defendant's confession was voluntary because he never requested his
mother's presence and because of his prior experiences with the police. Id. For
a discussion of Roane, see supra notes 129-33 and accompanying text.
140. For a discussion of MicCutchen, see supra notes 137-39 and accompany-
ing text.
141. 466 Pa. 314, 353 A.2d 372 (1975).
142. Id. at 326, 353 A.2d at 378. In JVebster, a sixteen year old child, unac-
companied by an adult, was being questioned as a witness in a murder investiga-
tion when the police obtained information that he was actually implicated. Id. at
327, 353 A.2d at 378. The police called his mother to obtain permission to
continue the questioning of the son as a suspect but never advised her of his
rights with respect to the questioning. Id.
143. Id. at 327, 353 A.2d at 378. Rather, the court explained, "the younger
and more immature the offender the greater is the government's responsibility
to provide an opportunity for the counselling of an attorney or the guidance of
an informed parent or guardian." Id. at 327 n.5, 353 A.2d at 378 n.5 (citing
Note, Due Process Reasons for Exchding Juvenile Court Confessions from Criminal Trials,
50 CALIF. L. REV. 902 (1962)). The court concluded, however, that the defend-
ant's statement had been improperly admitted into evidence. 466 Pa. at 324,
353 A.2d at 379. The dissent observed that the majority had indeed applied a
per se exclusionary rule. Id. at 329, 353 A.2d at 379-80 (Pomeroy, J., dissent-
ing). The dissent added that "this ill-conceived per se rule ... is . . . totally
without basis in law or logic." Id. at 329, 353 A.2d at 379 (Pomeroy, J., dissent-
ing). The dissent argued that the constitutional rights of a defendant were per-
sonal to the individual, therefore necessitating an inquiry into the totality of the
circumstances. Id.
144. See, e.g., Commonwealth v. Gaskins, 471 Pa. 238, 369 A.2d 1285
(1977) (confession of sixteen-vear-old without prior consultation of parent was
suppressed); Commonwealth v. Smith, 465 Pa. 310, 350 A.2d 410 (1976) (state-
ment obtained after third interrogation and without previous consultation with
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elaborate the requirements for a valid waiver. 14 5 In this regard, the
parent was suppressed); Commonwealth v. Chaney, 465 Pa. 407, 350 A.2d 829
(1975) (sixteen-year-old's waiver obtained prior to consultation with mother is
ineffective); Commonwealth v. Riggs, 464 Pa. 208, 348 A.2d 429 (1975) (waiver
made without benefit of counsel or adult guidance is involuntary). These courts
relied on Roae and its progeny in ruling that such waivers were ineffective. See,
e.g., Commonwealth v. Chaney, 465 Pa. 407, 409, 350 A.2d 829, 830 (1975)
("[MCutchen, Starkes and Roane] held that absent a showing that a juvenile had
an opportunity to consult with an interested and informed parent or adult or
counsel before he waived his Miranda rights, his waiver will be ineffectual.").
The requirements of the rule and its rationale have been succinctly stated:
Because of the unique disadvantage in the custodial interrogation pro-
cess of the youthful accused due to his immaturity, it was recognized
that merely a consideration of the fact of youth in the totality of the
circumstances formation ... was inadequate to insure that a juvenile's
waiver was indeed a knowing one .... T]he administering of Aliranda
warnings to a juvenile, without providing an opportunity to that juve-
nile to consult with a mature, informed individual concerned primarily
with the interest of the juvenile, was inadequate to offset the disadvan-
tage occasioned by his youth. The new rule appreciates that the inex-
perience of the minor affects not only his or her ability to understand
the full implication and consequences of the predicament but also ren-
ders the judgment inadequate to assess the spectrum of considerations
encompassed in the waiver decision. It was therefore reasoned that the
impediment of immaturity can only be overcome where the record es-
tablishes that the youth had access to the advice of an attorney, parent,
or other interested adult and that the consulted adult was informed as
to the constitutional rights available to the minor and aware of the con-
sequences that might follow the election to be made.
Commonwealth v. Smith, 472 Pa. 492, 497-99, 372 A.2d 797, 800 (1977) (over-
ruled by Commonwealth v. Williams, 504 Pa. 511, 475 A.2d 1283 (1984)) (cita-
tions and footnotes omitted).
In dissenting opinions, Justice Pomeroy continued to argue that the per se
rule was "unwise, unnecessary and unwarranted" and that the rule merely sub-
stituted thejudgment of an adult for that of a minor. Commonwealth v. Chaney,
465 Pa. 407, 409, 350 A.2d 829, 831 (1975) (Pomeroy, J., dissenting). See also
Smith, 472 Pa. 492, 372 A.2d 797. The dissent in Smith argued that the per se
rule was "unnecessarily protective and overly paternalistic," precluding police
questioning until a suitable mentor could be located. Id. at 508-09, 372 A.2d at
804-05 (Pomeroy, J., dissenting). Furthermore, the dissent argued that
Ithere] is no guarantee that a subsequent waiver by the minor of his
rights is truly voluntary. Circumstances are easily imaginable where a
minor who would not otherwise cooperate with the police will do so on
the advice of a parent who, although aware of the nature of the minor's
rights, nevertheless advises him to tell the police the truth. The onl'
way to prevent this is to inquire also into what advice is actually given
by the adult and then pass judgment on whether that advice helped the
juvenile do what was best for himself in that situation. Are we to say
that the nature and content of a consultation between a minor and a
parent or other adult are to be examined by a suppression court, that
the soundness of the advice given must be evaluated and the validity of
the confession determined in the light of such findings? If so, a new
and, I submit, unnecessary avenue of inquiry will be opened without
any corresponding improvement in the ability of the court to fulfill its
function of determining the voluntariness of a juvenile confession.
Id. at 508-09, 372 A.2d at 805 (Pomeroy, J., dissenting) (footnote omitted).
145. See, e.g., Commonwealth v. Gaskins, 471 Pa. 238, 369 A.2d 1285
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court ruled that unless the adult or parent consultant was "interested"
in the welfare of the minor, the minor's waiver would be ineffective. 14 6
Further, the court clarified the requirement that the adult must be "in-
formed", 14 7 and explained the requirement that the minor must be
given an "opportunity to consult" with a parent.' 48
C. The Presumption of Incompetency to Waive
The Pennsylvania Supreme Court has never unanimously adopted
either the totality of the circumstances or the per se test. 14 ) Increasingly
dissatisfied with the inflexibility of the per se rule, the court began to
relax the rule's requirements. 150 In Commonwealth v. Veltre 151 an equally
divided court affirmed a juvenile's conviction on murder and rape
charges, ruling that his confession was admissible under the totality of
(1977). The court stated that the mere offer by the police to allow a mother to
accompany her sixteen-year-old son to the station failed to satisfy the require-
merit of an opportunity to consult prior to an effective waiver. Id. at 241, 269
A.2d at 1286.
146. See, e.g., Commonwealth v. Smith, 472 Pa. 492, 372 A.2d 797 (1977)
(father who declined to accompany son to police station, merely went to work,
and never followed up on son's whereabouts, was not the interested adult envi-
sioned by the rule) (overruled by Commonwealth v. Williams, 504 Pa. 511, 475
A.2d 1283 (1984)); Commonwealth v. Thomas, 486 Pa. 568, 406 A.2d 1037
(1979), rev'g 258 Pa. Super. 332, 392 A.2d 820 (1978) (prison counselor quali-
fied as an "interested adult") (also overruled by Williams).
147. Commonwealth v. Smith, 472 Pa. 492, 372 A.2d 797 (1977) (warnings
merely read in presence of parent with no acknowledgment of understanding
did not make the parent "informed") (overruled by Commonwealth v. Williams,
504 Pa. 511, 475 A.2d 1283 (1984)).
148. Commonwealth v. McFadden, 470 Pa. 604, 369 A.2d 1156 (1977) (ten
minutes alone with mother in living room while handcuffed to a chair provided a
suflicient "opportunity to consult").
149. See, e.g., supra notes 133-44.
150. See, e.g., Commonwealth v. Nelson, 488 Pa. 148, 411 A.2d 740 (1980).
In .Vrho, an equally divided court affirmed the lower court's suppression of the
juvenile's statement, concluding that he had not been provided an opportunity
to consult with an interested adult prior to waiving his right against self-incrimi-
nation. Id. at 152-53, 411 A.2d at 742. The opinion in support of reversal pro-
posed an alternative test: a juvenile's waiver made in the absence of an adult
would be effective when the accused's age, experience, and intelligence indi-
cated that the "presence of an interested adult [would] not significantly contrib-
ute to I the minor'sI comprehension and understanding of the situation." Id. at
162, 411 A.2d at 747 (Larsen,J., opinion in support of reversal). Given that the
appellee was two months younger than eighteen, was experienced with the crin-
inaljustice system, and comprehended his constitutional rights, the opinion con-
cluded that no purpose would be served by "drawing a 'brightline' at the
magical moment appellee reaches the age of eighteen." Id. Since under the
totality of the circumstances the juvenile had waived his constitutional right to
remain silent, the opinion recommended reversal of the suppression of the con-
fession. Id. at 163-64, 411 A.2d at 747 (Larsen, J., opinion in support of
reversal).
151. 492 Pa. 237, 424 A.2d 486 (1980).
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the circumstances.1 52 The court declined to apply the per se rule be-
cause the purpose of the rule-preventing the loss of constitutional pro-
tection as a result of "the innocence and inexperience of youth being
taken advantage of by overbearing interrogation-would not be ad-
vanced" in Veltre. 15 3 The court leaned toward rejecting the per se rule in
favor of the more flexible approach that includes youth, inexperience,
and comprehension as factors.' 54
Recently, in Commonwealth v. Christmas,15 5 a majority of the court
overruled the previously espoused per se rule. The defendant in Christ-
mas was almost eighteen years old when he was arrested for possession
of 744 packets of heroin.' 56 Although the minor had consulted with his
father prior to confessing, there was no evidence that his father had
been informed of his son's constitutional rights prior to their consulta-
tion. 157 Reasoning that the goal of the per se rule-the protection of
152. Id. at 243-44, 424 A.2d at 488-89. The lower court had admitted in-
culpatory statements made by a sixteen-year-old juvenile. Id. at 239, 424 A.2d at
486. The juvenile, Veltre, was convicted of the brutal rape of a woman and of
murdering the woman and her two-year-old daughter. Id. at 239-40, 424 A.2d at
486. After a conversation with his probation officer, Veltre waived his right to
remain silent. Id. at 240-41, 424 A.2d at 487. The court cited thejuvenile's age
(13 months under the age of maturity), previous experience with the criminal
justice system, demonstrated understanding of his rights, and consultation with
his probation officer as relevant factors in this determination. Id. at 242, 424
A.2d at 487.
153. Id. at 242, 424 A.2d at 487. The court concluded that Veltre was not
the innocent, inexperienced youth the per se rule was designed to protect. Id. at
242-43, 424 A.2d at 489. Rather, the court argued that application of the per se
rule would merely result in the senseless exclusion of reliable evidence and the
needless repetition of a fair trial. d. at 243, 424 A.2d at 489.
154. See id. at 243, 424 A.2d at 489. The court postulated that the presence
of an interested adult was not necessary for all juveniles. Id.
Faking the opposite view, the opinion in support of reversal urged adher-
ence to the "interested" adult rule to safeguard the interests ofjuveniles. Id. at
244-45, 424 A.2d at 489 (Roberts, J., opinion in support of reversal). Justice
Roberts asserted that "the interested adult rule reflects the jurisprudential wis-
dom of the observation that . . . 'It]he quality of a nation's civilization can be
largely measured by the methods used in the enforcement of its criminal laws.' "
Id. at 245, 424 A.2d at 489-490 (quoting Schaefer, Federalism and State Criminal
Procedure, 70 HARV. L. REv. 1, 26 (1956)). He also noted that the clear trend in
other jurisdictions was towards the adoption of an "interested" adult require-
ment for valid juvenile waivers. d. at 245, 424 A.2d at 490.
Justice Nix, in a separate opinion in support of reversal, emphasized that the
characterization of the "interested" adult rule as a per se rule was a misnomer
because a juvenile could give a statement that would later be admitted at trial if
an adult had advised the juvenile to waive his rights. Id. at 248, 424 A.2d at 491
(Nix, J., opinion in support of reversal). Further, Justice Nix argued that the
record in V'eltre did not support the conclusion that the juvenile was streetwise
because there was evidence that the minor was severely retarded and mentally
ill. Id. at 249, 424 A.2d at 491.
155. 502 Pa. 218, 465 A.2d 989 (1983) (overruled by Commonwealth v.
Williams, 504 Pa. 511, 475 A,2d 1283 (1984)).
156. Id. at 220, 465 A.2d at 991.
157. Id. Ironically, the juvenile defendant's father was a police officer. Id.
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the juvenile's interests-could be achieved in a manner that would also
protect the interests of society,' 58 the court stepped back from the per
se rule in deciding that adequate protections would be afforded by a
presumption that a juvenile is incapable of waiving his constitutional
rights without prior consultation with an "interested" and informed
adult. 15 9 This presumption, the court concluded, could be rebutted
only when the evidence clearly demonstrated that, under the totality of
the circumstances, the juvenile had made a voluntary, knowing, and in-
telligent waiver of his or her rights.16
0
D. Return to Totality of the Circumstances
Recently, in Commonwealth v. Williams, 16 1 the Pennsylvania Supreme
Court abandoned the presumption established in Christmas162 and re-
adopted the totality of the circumstances test for purposes of evaluating
158. Id. at 223, 465 A.2d at 992. The majority reasoned that the per se rule
served to suppress juvenile confessions that were in fact rendered in a knowing,
intelligent, and voluntary manner. Id.
159. Id.
160. Id. The majority reasoned that the use of this presumption adequately
served the competing interests of the juvenile and society. Id. The court ex-
plained that the presumption of inadmissibility would protect the ordinary juve-
nile from his or her immaturity yet, in extreme cases of clear waiver, the waiver
of a juvenile would be valid under an examination of the surrounding circum-
stances. Id. Considering the totality of the circumstances, the majority con-
cluded that the juvenile in Christmas had validly waived his rights even though he
had not consulted with an "informed adult." Id. at 22-24, 465 A.2d at 992-93.
Although the juvenile's father had not been advised of his son's constitutional
rights prior to consultation, the court stated that this deficiency was overcome by
the youth's relative maturity and prior experience in the legal system. Id. at 224,
465 A.2d at 992-93. The juvenile had been arrested 17 times before, adjudi-
cated delinquent three times, and committed to two different youth detention
centers. Id.
The concurring opinion in Christmas supported the abandonment of the per
se rule but disagreed with the adoption of the presumption espoused by the
majority, believing that it muddled and confused the analysis. Id. at 225, 465
A.2d at 993 (Larsen,J., concurring). Justice Larsen reasoned that, in addition to
permitting an inference, a presumption shifts the burden of proof. Id. at 224-25,
465 A.2d at 992 (Larsen, J., concurring). Adoption of this presumption, Justice
Larsen concluded, might confuse that issue since the Commonwealth always has
had the burden of proving that a waiver was voluntary, knowing, and intelligent.
Id. Justice Larsen, therefore, would have reverted to the totality of the circum-
stances analysis which, in his view, previously had proved successful. Id.
Justice Hutchins, in a separate concurring opinion, also favored abandon-
ment of the per se rule and readoption of the totality of the circumstances ap-
proach with youth, experience, and need for adult consultation considered as
factors in that approach. Id. at 227-28, 465 A.2d at 494 (Hutchins, J.,
concurring).
161. 504 Pa. 511,475 A.2d 1283 (1984).
162. Id. at 521, 475 A.2d at 1288. The court stated that the presumption
served "no analytical purpose" since it merely reaffirmed the Commonwealth's
burden of proof. Id.
29
Shaffner: Around and Around on Pennsylvania's Juvenile Confession Carousel:
Published by Villanova University Charles Widger School of Law Digital Repository, 1985
VILLANOVA LAW REVIEW [Vol. 30: p. 1235
the validity of a juvenile's waiver.' 6 In Williams, a juvenile defendant
was arrested for robbery six months before his eighteenth birthday. '6 4
In applying a totality of the circumstances test, the court explained that
the youth of the accused, his or her experience and comprehension of
the constitutional rights involved, and the presence or absence of an
interested adult are to be considered, but that no single factor is
determinative. 15
In his concurring opinion in Williams, Justice Flaherty argued that
the totality of the circumstances analysis provided inadequate protection
for juveniles because of its failure to recognize that the opportunity to
consult with an interested and informed adult is a necessary safeguard of
ajuvenile's constitutional rights. 166 Justices Nix and Zappala, in individ-
ual dissenting opinions, strongly objected to the majority's reversion to
the totality of the circumstances approach. 16 7 Since, in their view, the
majority's approach abandoned any modicum of protection afforded by
the rebuttable presumption of Christmas, the dissenting Justices con-
tended that a per se exclusionary rule should be applied to all juvenile
waivers obtained by the police without first allowing the juvenile to con-
stilt with an interested and informed adult. 1 8
163. For a discussion of previous Pennsylvania cases decided under the to-
talitv of the circumstances test, see supra notes 120-28 and accompanying text.
In ll'illiams, the defendant waived his constitutional rights after consultation with
his father. 504 Pa. at 514-15, 475 A.2d at 1284-85. The lower court, however,
suppressed Williams' subsequent inculpatory statement on the ground that the
father had not been advised of his son's rights prior to the consultation. Id.
After tracing the applicable Pennsylvania case law, the court determined
that the requirements of due process are satisfied by an examination of the total-
ity of the circumstances. I. at 521, 475 A.2d at 1288.
164. 504 Pa. at 514, 475 A.2d at 1284.
165. Id. at 521, 475 A.2d at 1288.
166. Id. at 522-23, 475 A.2d at 1288 (FlahertyJ., concurring). Justice Fla-
herty reasoned that the presumption was necessary because most juveniles suiffer
from a diminished capacity to understand the consequences of their actions, to
resist police coercion, and to make adequate judgments. Id. at 523-24, 475 A.2d
at 1289 (FlahcrtyJ., concurring). He concluded that the analytical framework of
the totality of the circumstances test was inadequate because it failed to recog-
nize the vulnerable position of a minor. Id.
167. Id. at 524-26, 475 A.2d at 1289 (Nix, J., dissenting); id. at 526-28, 475
A.2d at 1290 (Zappala, .., dissenting).
168. 504 Pa. at 524-26, 475 A.2d at 1289 (Nix, J., dissenting); id. at 526-28,
475 A.2d at 1290 (Zappala, J., dissenting). Both justices claimed that they had
joined the majority in Christmas only to preserve some modicum of protection for
juveniles. Id. Apparently both justices felt that the irrebuttable presumption
was an appropriate compromise to prevent reversion to the former totality of
the circumstances standard.
Justice Nix reasoned that the majority's retreat from the per se rule in re-
cent cases had been motivated in large part by a need to respond to the heinous
nature of the crimes involved in those cases. 504 Pa. at 525, 475 A.2d at 1290
(Nix, J., dissenting). Justice Nix observed that
[tihis capability on the part of some juveniles, however, does not war-
rant a relaxing of our vigil in determining whether the custodial state-
1264
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V. CONCLUSION
The Pennsylvania judiciary has come full circle in its rulings on the
appropriate standard for determining the validity of a juvenile's waiver
of his or her right against self-incrimination. The court moved first from
the traditional totality of the circumstances test to a rigid per se rule,
excluding juvenile confessions obtained without prior consultation with
an interested and informed adult. 165 Over the course of the last few
years, the court developed exceptions to the per se rule and then, re-
cently, abandoned the rule completely and reverted to the former total-
ity of the circumstances standard. 1711
The court's previous adoption of the per se rule has been hailed by
commentators as a model of enlightened recognition of the juvenile's
vulnerable status. Empirical studies also have supported the conclusion
that juveniles need added protection during custodial interrogation.17'
For some reason, however, the Pennsylvania Supreme Court apparently
now feels confident that courts can competently evaluate whether ajuve-
nile's waiver is truly voluntary by examining all the attendant circum-
stances. One might question this position given the justices' general
inability to unanimously agree on whether a juvenile's waiver has been
voluntary, knowing, and intelligent under the totality of the circum-
stances test. 172 Nevertheless, the court has not clarified the standards
for applying the totality of the circumstances test, as it might have by
specifying the factors to consider or the relative importance of such
factors,
The most significant problem in the court's changing approach to
ments are voluntarily made. It is legitimate to punish the juvenile
offender for the crime he commits, and that punishment should be
commensurate with the crime committed. However, regardless of the
nature of the crime, the procedure by which we adjudicate his guilt
should not ignore the impediment of immaturity.
Id. at 525-26, 475 A.2d at 1289 (Nix, J., dissenting).
169. For a discussion of the totality of the circumstances approach, see
supra notes 120-28 and accompanying text. For a discussion of Pennsylvania's
per se rule, see supra notes 129-48 and accompanying text.
170. For a discussion of the exceptions to the per se rule and its recent
abandonment, see supra notes 149-68 and accompanying text.
17 1. For a discussion of empirical studies that have demonstrated the need
for additional protections for juvenile offenders, see spra notes 76-88 and ac-
companying text.
172. Opinions of the Pennsylvania Supreme Court concerning the validity
of juvenile confessions are fraught with dissents that debate the validity of the
current test for evaluating waivers. In addition to basic disagreements about the
protections to be accorded juveniles, the dissents frequently disagree as to
whether there actually has been a knowing and voluntary waiver by the juvenile
under the totality of the circumstances test. See, e.g., Commonwealth v. Irvin,
462 Pa. 383, 341 A.2d 132 (1975); Commonwealth v. Webster, 466 Pa. 314, 353
A.2d 372 (1975); Commonwealth v. Porter, 449 Pa. 153, 295 A.2d 311 (1972);
Commonwealth v. Moses, 446 Pa. 350, 287 A.2d 131 (1971); Commonwealth v.
Darden, 441 Pa. 41, 271 A.2d 257, cerl. denied, 401 U.S. 1004 (1970).
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the admissibility of juvenile confessions is its inability to reach a lasting
consensus on the appropriate standard for evaluating the validity of a
juvenile's waiver. Neither the police nor the courts can be certain of the
appropriate standard to follow because the test has changed every few
years. At a minimum, it is suggested, the police must know the circum-
stances under which a waiver will withstand judicial scrutiny so that con-
victions are not reversed on appeal because of the procedures they may
or may not have followed.1 73
In Fare v. Michael C., the United States Supreme Court approved the
totality of the circumstances test as a method for evaluating the validity
of a juvenile's waiver of constitutional rights.174 This does not prevent
the states, however, from providing additional protections for juveniles.
Indeed, some states have enacted statutes that render admissible any
waiver by a juvenile that the police have obtained in the absence of pa-
rental guidance or consent.' 7 5 It is important that Pennsylvania adopt
similar legislation to protect juveniles in custodial interrogations and to
end the recurrent shifting of position on this issue by the state's
supreme court. 176 Over time, unnecessary suppressions could be
avoided if the police had stable, clear-cut guidelines to follow. The en-
actment of a per se rule would thereby benefit both the interests of
juveniles and society.
Paula D. Shaffner
173. Indeed, one may wonder what justification the police would have for
failing to contact a minor's parent or interested adult prior to custodial interro-
gation. The only valid reason may be the inconvenience and delay involved in
locating such an adult. Since most juvenile confessions made after consultation
with an interested adult are admissible, the motives behind police interrogation
of a juvenile without adult advice are certainly suspect.
174. For a discussion of the United States Supreme Court's opinion in Fare
v. Michael C., see supra notes 54-56 and accompanying text.
175. For a listing of the states that have promulgated such statutes, see
supra note 89. Alternative or additional protections have also been afforded in
other jurisdictions in various forms. For a discussion of these protections, see
supra notes 111-14 and accompanying text.
176. Because the United States Supreme Court approved the totality of the
circumstances approach to the evaluation of juvenile confessions in Fare v.
Michael C., any further protection required by the state must rest on adequate
and independent state grounds. See generally Note, supra note 56 (advocating leg-
islative resolution of this issue); Comment, Preadjudicatory Confessions, supra note 6
(urging action by the state legislature to adopt a parental presence require-
ment). At a minimum, a simplified version of the Miranda warnings could be
fashioned specifically for juveniles. See Griss, supra note 6, at 1161-64.
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